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INTERPRETING THE OIL POLLUTION ACT OF 1990 
(OPA 90) AS INAPPLICABLE TO THE NATURAL GAS 





The ELLEN G. TITAN navigates the Charles River towards Everett, 
Massachusetts, carrying 210 thousand cubic meters of liquefied natural gas 
(“LNG”).
2
 Coast Guard patrol craft flank the vessel.
3
  Massachusetts state 
police secure the shore and bridges. It is just one delivery of many 
shipments that supply LNG to the northeast United States.  The ELLEN G. 
TITAN passes abeam of the U.S.S. CONSTITUTION, a wooden naval 
                                                                                                                 
 1. George Mason University School of Law, J.D. Candidate, May 2018; United States 
Coast Guard Academy, B.S., Government, May 2007.  The views expressed herein are 
solely those of the author and are not to be construed as official or reflecting the views of the 
Commandant, the U.S. Coast Guard, or the U.S. Government.  I am grateful for the 
assistance of Professor Jeremy Rabkin, Mr. Michael Goad, Douglas Brooking and Samuel 
Jimison in preparing this article.  Any errors that remain are my own. 
 2. The Titan is a fictional LNG tanker.  The Q-Flex class of LNG tankers carries 
between 210 and 216 thousand cubic meters of LNG and have been arriving in the United 
States since 2008. See Qatargas, First Qatargas Q-Flex Reaches US, DOWNSTREAM TODAY, 
June 25, 2008, http://www.downstreamtoday.com/news/article.aspx?a_id=11548.  The 
Distrigas LNG Import Terminal in Everett, Massachusetts is the longest operating LNG 
import facility in the United States and serves nearly all of the gas utilities in New England. 
See, e.g., About LNG: The Role of LNG in the Northeast Natural Gas (and Energy) Market, 
NAT. GAS ASS’N, http://www.northeastgas.org/about_lng.php (last visited Mar. 30, 2018).   
 3. Following the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, the Coast Guard began escorting 
LNG tankers through Boston Harbor.  See, e.g., 147 Cong. Rec. S27739 (daily ed. Dec. 20, 
2001) (statement of Sen. Kerry). 
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sailing ship from the early days of the Republic.  To the northeast, Logan 
International Airport.  To the southwest, Boston’s historic North End.  Half 
a million people.  Then, the LNG containment is breached, followed by a 
spark.  And in a flash, literally, this entire area is leveled.  A humanitarian 
cataclysm.  An environmental catastrophe.  An economic calamity.  Such 
has been the fear since 2001.
4
  Perhaps an accident.  Perhaps terrorism.  
Perhaps some evidence survived vaporization, such as legislative 
breadcrumb trail. Perhaps there was a way to avoid this catastrophe, but the 
Oil Pollution Act of 1990 (“OPA 90”), and the Deepwater Port Act of 1974 
(“DPWA”), as amended by the Maritime Transportation Security Act of 
2002 (“MTSA”), acts meant to protect the environment and promote 
security, may thwart the solution. 
LNG is generally safe. The above scenario would occur only under rare 
conditions. While the likelihood of the above disaster is small, it is 
nevertheless possible. What if the ELLEN G. TITAN never entered the 
harbor, but could still transfer its clean energy?  Rather than enter port, 
what if the ELLEN G. TITAN could hook into a pipeline miles into the 
ocean, far from terrorist threats and far from the navigation hazards 
common when approaching land, such as currents, shoals, and other 
vessels?  This is the deepwater port concept.  It has been around for 
decades, though usage is minimal.  Despite the benefits to security and 
safety from deep-water location and benefits to the environment by 
reducing marine accidents and using cleaning-burning LNG whose 
accidental discharge would have minimal environmental impact, especially 
compared to oil, those who seek to construct deepwater ports face 
regulatory obstacles.  From a complex licensing process to approval from 
the coastal state, many laws and regulations govern the process.  While 
their merits are debatable, they are the law. However, one significant 
burden is not the law, but a questionable interpretation and application of 
OPA 90, a law seemingly inapplicable to the natural gas industry.   
                                                                                                                 
 4. See generally, MIKE HIGHTOWER ET AL., GUIDANCE ON RISK ANALYSIS AND SAFETY 
IMPLICATIONS OF A LARGE LIQUEFIED NATURAL GAS (LNG) SPILL OVER WATER (Sandia 
National Laboratories, Dec 2004).  In 2004, the Sandia National Laboratory, a division of 
the Department of Energy, assessed the danger posed by an intentional breach of an LNG 
carrier.  It concluded that major injuries and significant structural damage would occur 
within a 500-meter radius, with a significant potential for injuries and structural damage 
existing within a 1600-meter radius.  Parts of Boston could fall within a 500-meter radius of 
an LNG carrier transiting the Charles River en route to its terminal at Everett, 
Massachusetts.  See also Sean T. Dixon, Deepwater Liquefied Natural Gas Ports and the 
Shifting U.S. Liquefied Natural Gas Market, 17 OCEAN & COASTAL L.J. 1, 16-17 (2011). 
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Misinterpretation of one provision of the Act may result in imposing a 
$373 million barrier to construction.  A natural gas facility that handles 
natural gas must maintain this sum.  Why?  To fund clean-up costs in the 
event of an oil spill.  Although the requirement far exceeds of any risk of oil 
pollution, if that is what the law unambiguously requires, then that is what 
the law requires.  This result, however, is unintended and unnecessary.   
And, this provision is only applicable to the LNG industry because 
Congress amended a different law to which OPA 90 refers to incentivize 
deepwater LNG ports.   
Fortunately for the American energy renaissance,
5
 this comment 
maintains that OPA 90 is inapplicable to deepwater LNG ports.  Based on 
the (1) plain meaning of the text of OPA 90, (2) the clear intent of Congress 
when enacting OPA 90 and two related statutes, and (3) the purpose of all 
three acts, a deepwater LNG port should not be governed OPA 90. Thus, 
the government should find inapplicable the requirement that deepwater 
LNG port operators certify the availability of hundreds of millions of 
dollars in order to obtain a permit to operate.   
The inapplicability of OPA 90 does not mean a LNG facility would be 
exempt from liability if it causes environmental damage. Rather, the 
operator would foot the minimal remediation costs when pollution 
occurred.
6
 However, an author’s reasoned opinion is hardly sufficient; 
either the applicable regulatory agency – the United States Coast Guard – or 
a federal court would have to reach the same conclusion.  Or, Congress 
could amend Title 33 of the U.S. Code to remove any doubt.  The Coast 
Guard’s position fuels the uncertainty, likely caught unaware of the natural 
gas industry’s interest in deepwater LNG ports.  The same is true for the 
courts, though relevant litigation is sparse and what little does exist does 
not directly address the LNG applicability aspect. This result effectively 
requires each deepwater LNG port to seek a written exemption to OPA 90 
from the Coast Guard before starting construction or maintain hundreds of 
millions of dollars.
7
 Unfortunately, powerful interests may array against 
this reasonable interpretation. 
                                                                                                                 
 5. See discussion infra Section I.0. 
 6. These ports would still be considered an offshore facility under the Clean Water 
Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (2012), and specifically under 33 U.S.C. § 1321 (2012). 
 7. E.g., Letter from Daron T. Threet, counsel for Liberty Natural Gas, LLC to Curtis E. 
Borland, Vessel and Facility Operating Standards Division, U.S. Coast Guard, regarding the 
Port Ambrose Project; Determination of Non-Applicability of OPA 90 Financial 
Responsibility Provisions (Mar. 16, 2015). 
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Divided into three subparts, Part I of this comment provides relevant 
background.  Subpart A briefly traces the history of relevant legislation to 
identify the obscure connection to the natural gas industry.  Subpart B next 
examines the American energy renaissance and threats to its realizations.  
Part I finally concludes with Subpart C, which discusses both the future 
potential of the natural gas industry and transportation of LNG by sea.  Part 
II examines the regulatory figures and environment in which these figures 
regulate.  Part II continues by explaining the history of the relevant statutes 
and the statutory text at issue.  Part III discusses the flawed current 
application of OPA 90 to deepwater LNG ports and the potential for 
inconsistent application, unclear rules, and harmful outcomes from the 
current interpretative approach.  Part IV applies common methods of 
statutory interpretation to the relevant statutes to argue that the financial 
obligations imposed by OPA 90 on deepwater LNG ports are inapplicable 
given the text, intent, and purpose of the statute.  Part IV recommends that 
the Coast Guard exercise its interpretative discretion to find deepwater 
LNG ports outside OPA 90 and that federal regulators base OPA 90 
applicability determinations on an oil-centric commercial purpose test. 
I. The American Energy Renaissance and the Green Death 
In the 1300, the Black Death left a wake of death and destruction 
throughout Europe.  Some historians hypothesize that ships spread the 
disease from Asia into Europe.  But, from death springs life.  The shortage 
of labor transformed Europe, leading to an age of prosperity, innovation, 
and discovery that continues to this day.  In an interesting historical twist, 
while the European renaissance resulted from one colorful plague spread by 
ships, another may kill an American renaissance reliant on ships. Natural 
gas is major energy source, competing against traditional fossil fuels, 
nuclear energy, and newer renewable sources. Application of OPA 90 
represents an indirect method of attack for natural gas opponents; literal 
OPA 90 enforcement would impose an onerous cost on deepwater LNG 
ports far exceeding any risk posed to the marine environment.   
A. The Rest of the Story 
The story begins in 1975, when Congress enacted the Deepwater Port 
Act of 1974 (“DWPA”)
8
 to regulate offshore oil terminals.  In 1989, the 
Exxon Valdez spills 11 million gallons of crude oil into Alaskan waters after 
                                                                                                                 
 8. Deepwater Port Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-627, 89 Stat. 2126 (Jan. 3, 1975), 
codified as 33 U.S.C. §§ 1501-24. 
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/onej/vol3/iss6/6
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negligent operation runs it aground in Prince William Sound.
9
  In response, 
Congress enacted OPA 90
10
 to mitigate future oil spills into the oceans.
11
  In 
2001, 19 terrorists perpetrated the largest terrorist attack in U.S. history.  
Congress responded by enacting the Maritime Transportation Security Act 
of 2002 (“MTSA”)
12
 to secure maritime commerce and port facilities.
13
  
And in this decade, these three events may conspire to thwart the 
development of the natural gas industry, which is poised to lead the 
American “Energy Renaissance.”
14
   
Could this seemingly inexplicable connection to the natural gas industry, 
which resulted in the aforementioned potential destruction of Boston, be the 
work of the Illuminati, its goal still shrouded?  No, no need to reach for 
your tin-foil hat just yet.  The story is far less fascinating despite the 
significance of the impacts.  Rather, accidental convergence of legislation 
                                                                                                                 
 9. H.R. REP. NO. 101-241, pt. 1, at 30 (1989); H.R. REP. NO. 101-241, pt. 2, at 9-10 
(1989); S. REP. NO. 101-94, at 2 (1989). 
 10. Oil Pollution Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-380, 104 Stat. 484 (Aug. 18, 1990), 
codified primarily under 33 U.S.C. §§ 2701-62.  Other provisions were codified under 
Titles: 14 – Coast Guard (spill response technologies); 26 – Internal Revenue Code 
(regarding the Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund); 33 U.S.C. 1203, 1321, 1503, and 1517 (vessel 
communication equipment, spill contingency plans, and transfer of funds to the Oil Spill 
Liability Trust Fund); 43 – Public Lands (regarding the Trans-Alaska pipeline); and 46 – 
Shipping (new regulations on vessels transporting oil).  
 11. H.R. REP. NO. 101-241, pt. 1, 30; H.R. REP. NO. 101-241, pt. 2, at 10; S. REP. 101-
94, at 2-3.  Congress has been working on several provisions to expand liability for oil 
discharges for more than a decade, but this disaster provided the public attention and 
pressure necessary to enact statutory changes.  E.g., David H. Sump, The Oil Pollution Act 
of 1990: A Glance in the Rearview Mirror, 85 TUL. L. REV. 1101, 1103-04 (2011). 
 12. Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-295, 116 Stat. 2064 
(Nov. 25, 2002).  While the Act was introduced on 20 July 2001, prior to the September 11, 
2001 attacks, major changes to the language followed the attacks.  For example, the original 
senate bill and accompanying report had no reference to deepwater ports or LNG.  See S. 
REP. 107-64, at 15-20 (2001); S. 1214, 107th Cong., Cong. Rec. S8015-23 (2001) (as 
reported by S. Comm. on Commerce, Sci. & Transp.). 
 13. H.R. REP. NO. 107-777 § 101, at 3-5 (Nov. 13, 2002).  
 14. The “American Energy Renaissance” generally refers to a resurgence in U.S. oil and 
gas production beginning in the 2000s that may result in the U.S. being one of the largest, if 
not the largest, producer.  Production may exceed consumption by 2020.  It has been spurred 
by new technological developments that has made previously unrecoverable quantities of oil 
and gas recoverable.  The term has been adopted by the media, industry, and even Congress.  
See, e.g., Stephen Blank, “U.S. energy renaissance ruffles OPEC,” BALTIMORESUN.COM 
(Dec. 7, 2014, 6:00 AM),  http://touch.baltimoresun.com/#section/-1/article/p2p-82200550/; 
ADM Paul F. Zukunft, Commandant, United States Coast Guard, Address at U.S. Coast 
Guard Headquarters: The State of the United States Coast Guard 2015 (Feb. 24, 2015), 
https://www.uscg.mil/Leaders/Senior-Leadership/Commandant/.  
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may breach the hull of OPA 90, its mandates seeping into the regulatory 
environment to pollute related industries.  The security, economic, and 
environment implications, though dwarfed by the impending New World 
Order, may nonetheless be significant.  In the interim, we must examine our 
energy regulations so as not to incidentally channel our energy industry into 
insecure and inefficient routes. 
One must drill deep into legislation to find the circuitous connection.  
Natural gas is transported over long distances often as liquefied natural gas 
(“LNG”).
15
  Maritime transportation of LNG is common
16
  and these 
shipments are transferred pier-side.  But if thousands of miles of pipelines 
already transport energy across the country, why not extend these pipes into 
the ocean?  The oil industry asked this question and developed the 
deepwater port concept.  Though usage never became widespread, the idea 
is for oil tankers to discharge their oil into pipelines that extend miles into 
the ocean along the sea floor and then rise to the surface at a fixed 
location.
17
  A deepwater port is not a port in the traditional sense; it has no 
piers, buildings, or cranes. It is essentially a very long pipeline that 
transports oil – or LNG – from tankers at sea to shore-side facilities.  This 
method not only saves transit time, but keeps these vessels from hazards 
found when approaching land. 
Obviously, deepwater ports handling oil present a risk of a massive oil 
spill to the marine environment.  Realizing this risk, Congress enacted the 
DWPA to regulate these offshore ports.  At enactment in 1975, a deepwater 
port was limited to handling oil; no other cargo could be licensed.
18
  In 
response to the Exxon Valdez oil spill, OPA 90 sought to ensure that those 
who discharged oil into the marine environment – “responsible parties” – 
could meet the financial liability associated with a discharge.
19
  OPA 90 
                                                                                                                 
 15. Sheila Slocum Hollis, Liquefied Natural Gas: “The Big Picture” for Future 
Development in North America, 2 ENVT’L & ENERGY L. & POL’Y J. 5, 7 (2007); Robert H. 
Nicholas, Jr., Ocean Transportation of Oil and Gas and Hard Minerals, 51 ROCKY MT. MIN. 
L. INST. 17B-1 (2005). 
 16. See Zukunft, supra note 14; Nicholas, supra note 15. 
 17. Interesting, only 2 of the 20 applications received by the Maritime Administration 
(MARAD) were for deepwater oil ports.  The remaining 18 were for LNG ports.  See 
DEEPWATER PORT LICENSING PROGRAM, UNITED STATES MARITIME ADMINISTRATION, 
MARAD.DOT.GOV, http://www.marad.dot.gov/ports (last visited Jan. 2, 2016). 
 18. Deepwater Port Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-627, 89 Stat. 2126 (Jan. 3, 1975), 
codified as 33 U.S.C. §§ 1501-24. 
 19. 33 U.S.C. § 2716 (2012); see also H.R. REP. NO. 101-241, Pt. 1, at 38.  Exxon was 
eventually held liable for $2 billion, including $1 billion in clean-up costs, $500 million in 
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/onej/vol3/iss6/6
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required oil tankers and facilities to certify availability of funds to cover 
liability up to a statutory liability cap.
20
  As potential responsible parties, 
deepwater ports were specifically covered by OPA 90.
21
  OPA 90 defined 
deepwater ports by referencing the definition established by the DWPA.
22
  
A deepwater port has the highest maximum liability of all entities covered 
by the Act, initially $350 million dollars.
23
 
At this point, you are probably wondering what relevance an act that 
serves to mitigate oil pollution while also referring to another act that 
exclusively applies to oil facilities bears to the LNG industry.  This 
relevance was non-existent until at least until 2002.  Following the terrorist 
attacks on September 11, 2001, Congress enacted the MTSA.  One of its 
many provisions amended the DWPA to expand the definition of a 
deepwater port to permit LNG transportation.  The growing importance of 
LNG, and the perceived security risk posed by LNG tankers operating near 
major cities, made the deepwater oil port concept attractive for LNG.  
You are probably still wondering the applicability to LNG.  Although 
OPA 90 refers to deepwater ports, and deepwater ports can now be licensed 
for LNG transportation, LNG ports do not deal in oil; OPA 90 should be 
irrelevant.  Except, a deepwater LNG port may involve oil.  For example, it 
may use trace amounts of oil for hydraulics or as a lubricant.  And unlike 
for shore-side facilities and oil tankers, OPA 90 neither distinguishes the 
quantity of oil handled for deepwater ports nor does it distinguish the 
amount of funds facilities must certify based on quantity of oil or risk 
posed. Two barrels of oil might as well be two hundred thousand.  Does the 
statutory language of OPA 90, applicable to a “facility” is “used for” the 
“purposes” of “handling” oil, cover deepwater LNG ports that make 
incident use of small amounts of oil?  The answer, much like the 
controversial decision in King v. Burwell,
24
 turns on the meaning of a few 
words.  Is a deepwater LNG port a “facility” “used for” the “purposes” of 
                                                                                                                 
damages to commercial fisherman and locals, and $500 million in punitive damages.  E.g., 
Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471, 476, 515 (2008) (discussing Exxon’s liability).  
 20. 33 U.S.C. § 2716(c)(2). 
 21. 33 U.S.C. § 2701(6), (9), (22) (2012); 33 U.S.C. § 2716(c). 
 22. 33 U.S.C. § 2701(6). 
 23. 33 U.S.C. § 2704 (2012).   
 24. King v. Burwell, 576 U.S. ___, 135 S. Ct. 2480 (2015) (finding that a health care 
exchange established by the Federal government was an exchange “established by the 
State”). 
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The application of OPA 90 to deepwater LNG ports imposes a 
tremendous burden on this nascent industry, thwarting its development.  A 
deepwater LNG port that uses a barrel or two of oil must assure the 
availability of more than a third of a billion dollars just to get a permit to 
operate, around $4 million per gallon of oil. This is well in excess of the 
per-gallon cleanup cost.  It would be ironic if one statute meant to lessen 
pollution and another meant to increase security united to hinder a time-
saving and security-enhancing process for tapping a cleaner energy source 
that would have a minimal impact on the marine environment if discharged.  
But, unforeseeable consequences tend to accompany complex laws.  
B. The Energy Renaissance  
In the last thirty years, domestic energy extraction declined, forcing the 
U.S. to rely on imported oil, and to a lesser extent, natural gas.
26
  The first 
two decades of the twenty-first century, however, may result in another 
reversal.
27
  New technologies may transform the United States from the 
world’s largest importer of oil and gas into the world’s largest producer 
and, potentially, exporter.
28
  After more than 40 years of extraction, proven 
domestic oil reserves have approached their 1973 level and proven 
domestic reserves of natural gas is at an all-time high, 40 percent higher 
                                                                                                                 
 25. The statutory maximum liability for deepwater ports is $373.8 million dollars as of 
2014.  This amount is more than four times the requirement for the next highest facility, the 
deepwater Louisiana Offshore Oil Port (LOOP), which has a special statutory cap among 
deepwater ports.  See 33 C.F.R. § 138.230 (2014).  The initial statutory cap was set at $350 
million and has been increased periodically for inflation, as permitted by law.  See 33 U.S.C. 
§§ 2701(a)(4), 2704(d)(4).  A deepwater port is required to certify funds to meet its 
maximum liability.  See 33 U.S.C. § 2716 (c)(2).  However, the secretary of the department 
in which the Coast Guard is operating (currently the Department of Homeland Security) may 
lower the liability limit to not less than $50 million if risk so warrants (approximately $53 
million adjusted for inflation).  33 U.S.C. § 2704(d)(2).  This has not occurred. 
 26. U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., U.S. CRUDE OIL AND NATURAL GAS PROVED RESERVES, 
Year-end 2016, 2, 5 (Feb. 2018) [hereinafter EIA, PROVED RESERVES 2016]; U.S. ENERGY 
INFO. ADMIN., ANNUAL ENERGY OUTLOOK 2015 WITH PROJECTIONS TO 2040, 17 (Apr. 2015) 
[hereinafter EIA, ENERGY OUTLOOK 2015]. 
 27. See EIA, PROVED RESERVES 2016, supra note 26; EIA, ENERGY OUTLOOK 2015, 
supra note 26, at 21-22. 
 28. See Zukunft, supra note 14. 
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  This reversal only commenced in the last decade and 
identification of new proven reserves shows no signs of abating.
30
  The 
American energy industry is experiencing a rebirth, an “energy 
renaissance.”   
The U.S. and other nations may turn to natural gas as a cleaner 
alternative to oil, a “bridging strategy” to renewable forms of energy.
31
  
Before recent discoveries, a shift to natural gas required the U.S. to be a net 
importer natural gas.  But now, the U.S. is poised to become a major 
exporter of natural gas.  Domestic consumption of natural gas has steadily 
increased since the 1980s.
32
  Currently, the vast majority of imports and 
exports are to or from Canada and Mexico and are via pipeline.
33
  Higher 
domestic production has resulted in sharply declining net imports.
34
  If this 
trend continues, exporting natural may become increasingly lucrative,
35
 
especially if other countries supplement natural gas for oil or coal.  Since 
2010, the Department of Energy, who must approve exports of natural gas, 




                                                                                                                 
 29. See EIA, PROVED RESERVES 2016, supra note 26; U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., U.S. 
CRUDE OIL, NATURAL GAS, AND NATURAL GAS LIQUIDS RESERVES, 2000 ANNUAL REPORT 
(Dec. 2001). 
 30. See EIA, PROVED RESERVES 2016, supra note 26. 
 31. See Josh Lute, LNG Terminals: Future or Folly?, 43 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 621, 624-
25 (2007); Matt Salo et al., U.S. LNG Export Projects: Regulatory Outlook and Contracting 
Mechanism, 8 TEX. J. OIL GAS & ENERGY L. 61, 63-64 (2012-2013); U.S. ENERGY INFO. 
ADMIN., NATURAL GAS EXPLAINED: NATURAL GAS AND THE ENVIRONMENT, EIA.GOV, 
http://www.eia.gov/energyexplained/index.cfm?page=natural_gas_environment (last visited 
Mar. 26, 2018) (noting that natural gas produces nearly half the CO2 as coal and a quarter of 
the CO2 as oil); David B. Spence, Federalism, Regulatory Lags, and the Political Economy 
of Energy Production, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 431, 441 (2013) (detailing the substantially lower 
emission of various pollutants by natural gas as compared to coal and oil). 
 32. See EIA, PROVED RESERVES 2016, supra note 26. 
 33. Id. 
 34. U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., U.S. NATURAL GAS IMPORTS & EXPORTS 2014 (May 11, 
2015). 
 35. See, e.g., Dixon, supra note 4, at 29-30. 
 36. See Salo, supra note 31, at 66, 68.  33 U.S.C. § 1502(9) was amended in 2012 in 
anticipation of exports by the Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation Act of 2012, Pub. L. 
No. 112-213, 124 Stat. 1540 (Dec. 20, 2012).  See also Northeast Natural Gas Association, 
About LNG: The Role of LNG in the Northeast Natural Gas (and Energy) Market, 
http://www.northeastgas.org/about_lng.php (last visited Mar. 26, 2018). 
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Maritime transportation represents an efficient and common method of 
long distance transportation, whether for importation or exportation.
37
  
When transported via ship, natural gas is first liquefied.
38
  Currently, 
maritime LNG shipments are generally transferred pier-side.  Pier-side 
infrastructure requires large tankers to navigate through shallow waters and 
moor at major port facilities located in major population centers or in key 
shipping chokepoints.   
A deepwater LNG port has several advantages over traditional land-
based facilities.  First, a deepwater port reduces the chance that a large, 
deep-draft LNG tanker will run aground in shallow waters or collide with 
other vessels in narrow waterways.  Second, LNG is highly explosive in 
gaseous form, making LNG tankers potential floating bombs.
39
  Bringing 
these vessels into port creates a tremendous risk from accidental explosions 
and presents an enticing target for terrorists.
40
  Third, mooring in port has 
costs, namely extra transit time, compulsory pilotage charges, and docking 
fees.  A deepwater port eliminates or minimizes these costs.   
Construction of a deepwater port requires approval by the U.S. Maritime 
Administration (“MARAD”).
41
  There have been twenty-one attempts to 
construct deepwater ports, either for oil or LNG, through the end of 2017.
42
  
MARAD approved ten of these ports for construction and denied two, 
whereas the applicants on the remaining nine applications withdrew 
entirely,
43
 including one pending application that a coastal state later 
rejected in November 2015.
44
  While the DWPA only included LNG ports 
                                                                                                                 
 37. Id.; Zukunft, supra note 14; Nicholas, supra note 15.  
 38. See Slocum Hollis, supra note 15, at 7; Nicholas, supra note 15. 
 39. See HIGHTOWER, supra note 4; Dixon, supra note 4, at 16-17.  To liquefy, natural 
gas must be super-cooled.  One coolant containment is breached, it will rapidly re-gasify.  
E.g., Nicholas, supra note 15, at 17B-4. 
 40. See HIGHTOWER, supra note 4; Dixon, supra note 4, at 16-17. 
 41. 33 U.S.C. § 1503 (2012); Organization and Delegation of Powers and Duties, 
Update of Secretarial Delegations, 68 Fed. Reg. 36,496 (June 18, 2003) (to be codified at 49 
C.F.R. pt. 1). 
 42. U.S. MAR. ADMIN., DEEPWATER PORT LOCATIONS & STATUS MAP, MARAD.DOT.GOV, 
http://www.marad.dot.gov/ports/ (last visited Mar. 2, 2018) [hereinafter MARAD, 
DEEPWATER PORT MAP]; FEDERAL ENERGY REG. COMMISSION, NORTH AMERICAN LNG 
IMPORT/EXPORT TERMINALS: EXISTING, FERC.GOV, http://www.ferc.gov/industries/gas/indus-
act/lng.asp (last visited Mar 2, 2018) [hereinafter FERC, TERMINALS]. 
 43. Id. 
 44. Letter from Andrew M. Cuomo, Governor of the State of New York, to Paul N. 
Jaenichen, Sr., Administrator of the U.S. Maritime Admin. regarding the Application of 
Liberty Natural Gas L.L.C. for the Port Ambrose Deepwater Port, Docket Number USCG-
2013-0363 (Nov. 12, 2015). 
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since 2002, nineteen of the twenty-one total applications have been for 
deepwater LNG ports.
45
  Of the ten approved, three are operational, one 
LNG port is under construction, and six LNG ports voluntarily surrendered 
their operating licenses.
46
  Of the three operational deepwater ports, two 
handle LNG and one handles oil.
47
  The one port under construction is 
approved to handle LNG.
48
     
There are twelve operational domestic LNG import and export terminals; 
two are the deepwater LNG ports and the remaining ten are shore-side 
facilities.
49
  Only one facility is currently authorized to export domestic 
LNG and three are permitted to re-export imported LNG.
50
  There are four 
other LNG terminals in the remainder of North America: one in Canada and 
three in Mexico.
51
  The location of ten shore-side facilities require LNG 
tankers to transit or moor near major population centers, critical 
infrastructure, or key waterways.
52
  Despite the benefits from locating LNG 
terminals offshore and the potential for a major import or export market, 
opponents of natural gas or its exportation may sink the deepwater LNG 
port concept.  
C. The Green Death 
One seemingly obvious potential threat to the natural gas industry is the 
oil industry.  Gas and oil are substitute goods.  However, while the major 
oil companies might seem to be the biggest threat, many are also in the 
natural gas business.
53
  Instead of thwarting natural gas development, these 
companies may facilitate it.  If the threat were to come from the oil 
industry, it would likely originate from smaller producers who are unable to 
produce natural gas profitably or from oil equipment or services providers 
that cannot adapt their business to service natural gas. 
                                                                                                                 
 45. Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-295, 116 Stat. 2064 
(Nov. 25, 2002); FERC, TERMINALS. 
 46. MARAD, DEEPWATER PORT MAP, supra note 42; FERC, TERMINALS, supra note 42. 
 47. MARAD, DEEPWATER PORT MAP, supra note 42. 
 48. Id. 
 49. FERC, TERMINALS, supra note 42.  
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. 
 52. Id.; see also U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., U.S. ENERGY MAPPING SYSTEM, EIA.GOV, 
http://www.eia.gov/state/maps.php?v=Natural%20Gas (last visited Jan. 2, 2016). 
 53. For example, Shell and Exxon Mobile are major natural gas producers.  Rakteem 
Katakey & Tara Petel, “Big Oil’s Plan to Become Big Gas,” BLOOMBERG.COM (June 1, 2015, 
6:00 PM), www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-06-01/big-oil-becomes-big-gas-as-
climate-threat-spurs-tussle-with-coal (last updated June 2, 2015, 5:04 AM).  
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A more likely scenario is protectionist economic policies thwarting the 
exportation of LNG.  Given the boon in domestic supplies and production, 
exporting natural gas looks more likely than importing it.  Congress has 
already displayed a penchant for protectionism by banning most exports of 
oil or natural gas and requiring permission from the Federal Energy 
Regulatory Commission (“FERC”) before exporting natural gas.
54
  The 
flawed rationale is that by banning exports, domestic energy prices will fall, 
to the benefit of domestic consumers.
55
  Of course, falling prices may make 
production uneconomical and mitigate the expected dip in prices.  
Regardless, strong political forces exist to prevent natural gas exportation. 
The nuclear and coal energy industries have voiced general concerns 
regarding greater use of natural gas.  Coal and nuclear power facilities have 
sought, some successfully, subsidies and protection from state 
governments.
56
  In 2017, FERC convened a technical conference and 
received 79 detailed post-conference public comments from states, utilities, 
and power generators regarding state support for certain forms of energy.
57
  
Many participants and commenters represented traditional energy, 
renewable energy, and environmental interest; these interests generally 
found natural gas as exerting a tremendous downward pressure on electric 
prices and argued for FERC to allow states to support non-natural gas 
generators.
58
  These same actors may seek other methods of thwarting the 
natural gas industry if FERC resists state efforts to thwart market forces.   
Another likely opponent to the natural gas industry comes from the 
radical wing of the environmental movement.  Natural gas burns cleaner 
than oil and accidental releases would evaporate harmlessly rather than 
gather on birds and beaches, but burning natural gas still releases 
greenhouse gases.  Some environmentalists oppose any use of fossil fuels.
59
 
                                                                                                                 
 54. See Dixon, supra note 4, at 5-6. 
 55. See Salo, supra note 31, at 78-79. 
 56. See generally post-conference public comments regarding state policies and 
wholesale electric capacity markets under FERC Docket AD17-11.   
 57. State Policies and Wholesale Markets Operated by ISO New England Inc., New 
York Independent System Operator, Inc., and PJM Interconnection, L.L.C., Notice Inviting 
Post-Technical Conference Comments, 82 Fed. Reg. 24,966, 24,966 (May 31, 2017); FERC 
Docket AD17-11. 
 58. FERC Docket AD17-11. 
 59. See, e.g., Linda Krop, Deepwater Port LNG Licensing Decisions: A Case Study 
Involving the Deepwater Port Act and the Coastal Zone Management Act, 5 GOLDEN GATE 
U. ENVTL. L.J. 227, 249-50 (2011) (stating that any greenhouse gas emission should be 
considered “as part of a cumulative problem that warrants consideration” when permitting 
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Also opposed by many environmentalists is the common method of 
extraction that has driven the resurgence of the domestic industry, hydraulic 
fracturing (or fracking).
60
 Natural gas is abundant and cheap, and thus 
presents an attractive alternative to more expensive wind and solar energy.  
The allure of cheap and cleaner natural gas undermines arguments that 
more expensive renewable sources are the only option to address 
environmental concerns or dwindling resources. 
Unlike a potential threat from energy competitors, environmental 
opposition to deepwater ports is not merely speculative.  For example, 
California rejected a deepwater port application in 2007 due to concerns 
over anticipated air pollution from vessels using the port.
61
  In November 
2015, New York similarly rejected a deepwater LNG port application for 
several reasons, including environmental concerns.
62
  The DWPA requires 
applicants to obtain the approval of the coastal state, though MARAD can 
overrule an environmental protection-based disapproval if it makes the 
license conditional on conformance to state environmental programs.
63
  
MARAD, however, did not overrule California’s disapproval, and offered 
no reason for rejecting the application other than California’s disapproval 
on environmental grounds.
64
  The Sierra Club, a prominent 
environmentalist organization, has also stated its opposition to increased 
natural gas production and has tried unsuccessfully to block LNG 
terminals.
65
   
Opponents could resort to traditional methods of competition, namely 
lobbying the legislature.  Such motives, once made apparent, may be 
                                                                                                                 
projects); Salo, supra note 31, at 81.  See also public comments from environmental groups 
under FERC Docket AD17-11. 
 60. David B. Spence, Federalism, Regulatory Lags, and the Political Economy of 
Energy Production, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 431, 433-34 (2013). 
 61. SEAN T. CONNAUGHTON, THE SECRETARY’S DECISION ON THE DEEPWATER PORT 
LICENSE APPLICATION OF BHP BILLITON LNG INTERNATIONAL INC., U.S. Maritime 
Administration (June 5, 2007) [hereinafter CONNAUGHTON, DECISION ON BHP BILLITON];  
see also Dixon, supra note 4, at 15; Krop, supra note 59, at 239-51. 
 62. See Letter from Andrew M. Cuomo, supra note 44.  The rejection letter cited risk 
from terrorism and natural disasters, interference with maritime traffic, and obstructing 
proposed offshore clean energy (wind) projects, and expressed skepticism that the natural 
gas would benefit New York consumers. 
 63. 33 U.S.C. § 1508 (2012); see also Dixon, supra note 4, at 15. 
 64. See CONNAUGHTON, DECISION ON BHP BILLITON, supra note 61. 
 65. See Salo, supra note 31, at 65-66, 77, 81, 93-94; Ayesha Rascoe, Sierra Club 
Opposes Maryland LNG Export Terminal, REUTERS.COM (Feb. 7, 2012, 4:45 PM), 
http://www.reuters.com/article/usa-lng-exports/sierra-club-opposes-maryland-lng-export-
terminal-idUSL2E8D771D20120207. 
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insufficient to halt political forces in favor of LNG use.  Intervention in the 
administrative process is another option, such as the Sierra Club’s 
unsuccessful attempts to block LNG terminals in the Chesapeake Bay and 
on the Louisiana/Texas border.
66
  But administrative agencies are subject to 
political pressure too, even if less so than Congress.   
The federal courts, however, represent another avenue of attack, one that 
is less responsive to political and public pressure.  LNG opponents, rather 
than directly opposing LNG, could instead go for the soft-kill.  Opponents 
could insist on an expansive interpretation of OPA 90 that imposes 
exorbitant financial requirements on deepwater LNG ports. Thus, the 
projects would be permissible, though uneconomical.
67
  Especially in the 
wake of the Deepwater Horizon disaster in 2010, what could be 
controversial about enforcing our oil pollution laws?  Any move to amend 
OPA 90 to set more equitable requirements for deepwater LNG ports would 
likely be controversial as the nuance of a highly technical change would 
likely be lost in the debate. Thus, the LNG option goes up in smoke, or 
rather, gasifies and evaporates. 
II. Text and Context: Key Actors, Historical Circumstances, and the Text 
of the Deepwater Port Act of 1974, Oil Pollution Act of 1990, the Maritime 
Transportation Security Act of 2002, and the Clean Water Act 
The applicability of OPA 90 to deepwater LNG ports turns on statutory 
interpretation.  Therefore, the apparent first place to consult is the statutory 
text.  In this case, the statute directly at issue is OPA 90. However, properly 
interpreting OPA 90 and determining what the law encompasses requires a 
deeper analysis into its background and the meaning of the chosen words 
and phrases.  This background includes the history and purpose of OPA 90 
as well as the DWPA and the MTSA.  One must also examine the different 
regulatory actors who interpret the statute.  This section begins by 
discussing who is responsible for interpreting the relevant statutes and the 
environment in which they interpret.  It then outlines the relevant text of the 
three relevant acts. 
                                                                                                                 
 66. See Salo, supra note 31, at 65. 
 67. Applicants for deepwater LNG ports have sought and received determinations from 
the U.S. Coast Guard that exempt their proposed ports from OPA 90 financial certification 
requirements.  That applicants seek specific determination of exemptions prior to proceeding 
indicates that the certification of financial responsibility imposes costs significant enough to 
likely be determinative of the applicant’s decision to build.  Note that the exemption would 
not exempt them from liability from a discharge of oil, only exempt them from having to 
certify $373 million in readily available funds.  See discussion infra Sections III.0-0, IV.0. 
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1. Regulatory Actors 
OPA 90, the DWPA, and the MTSA are three legislative acts covering a 
40-year span.  These acts confer regulatory power on executive agencies, 
notably FERC, MARAD, and the U.S. Coast Guard.  FERC is the primary 
regulator of the natural gas industry.
68
  Natural gas exports require an 
authorization order from FERC, with the determining criteria being whether 
exportation is “consistent with the public interest.”
69
  FERC’s reach does 
not extend to licensing deepwater LNG ports,
70
 though its approval remains 
relevant for ports that seek to export. 
Per the DWPA, MARAD issues licenses to construct deepwater ports.
71
 
However, MARAD does not make determination of compliance with 
applicable environmental regulations.  Instead, MARAD relies on the U.S. 
Coast Guard
72
 for such determinations, including applicability of OPA 90.
73
  
The determinative factor is whether a deepwater LNG port is a facility that 
is used for handling oil.
74
  
The final relevant regulatory actor is the federal courts, under which the 
Coast Guard’s interpretation of applicability can be challenged, either by a 
deepwater LNG port applicant upon who the Coast Guard foisted OPA 90’s 
financial certification requirement or by those opposed to the licensing.  
Judicial precedent generally grants executive agencies wide latitude in 
                                                                                                                 
 68. 15 U.S.C. 717 (2012). 
 69. 15 U.S.C. 717(b), (f) (2012). 
 70. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1503, 1504 (2012); Organization and Delegation of Powers and 
Duties, Update of Secretarial Delegations, 68 Fed. Reg. 36,496; see also Slocum Hollis, 
supra note 15, at 9-10. 
 71. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1503, 1504; Organization and Delegation of Powers and Duties, 
Update of Secretarial Delegations, 68 Fed. Reg. 36,496. 
 72. In addition to being a regulatory agency, the Coast Guard is a federal law 
enforcement agency and the smallest of the five armed services.  Unlike the other four 
services, the Coast Guard falls under the Department of Homeland Security.  Its varied 
mission portfolio includes defense operations, law enforcement, search and rescue, 
facilitating maritime transportation, pollution response, and drafting and enforcing a variety 
of waterway, shipping, and maritime safety regulations.   
 73. See, e.g., DAVID T. MATSUDA, THE SECRETARY’S DECISION ON THE DEEPWATER 
PORT LICENSE APPLICATION OF PORT DOLPHIN ENERGY LLC, U.S. Maritime Administration, 
21 (Oct. 26, 2009) [hereinafter MATSUDA, DECISION ON PORT DOLPHIN]; SEAN T. 
CONNAUGHTON, THE SECRETARY’S DECISION ON THE DEEPWATER PORT LICENSE 
APPLICATION OF NEPTUNE LNG LLC, U.S. Maritime Administration (Jan. 29, 2007) 
[hereinafter CONNAUGHTON, DECISION ON NEPTUNE LNG]. 
 74. 33 U.S.C. § 2701(6), (9). 
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interpreting statutes, with the degree of deference based on the degree of 
formality in the decision-making.
75
 
2. Deepwater Horizon 
In 2010, the Mobile Offshore Drilling Unit DEEPWATER HORIZON 
exploded in the Gulf of Mexico, resulting in the worst oil spill in U.S. 
history.
76
  More than three million barrels of oil poured into the Gulf of 
Mexico over the 87 days until the wellhead could be capped,
77
 making the 
discharge more than 10 times that of the EXXON VALDEZ.
78
  As a result, 
any legislative push to revise OPA 90’s liability limits to exempt deepwater 
LNG ports or to set a more appropriate liability limit is unlikely despite the 
vast difference between this accident and an accident from a deepwater 
LNG port.
79
  Given opposition of many environmental groups to weakening 
environmental regulations or to the use of fossil fuels, these groups will 
likely lobby strongly against a change in legislation even if the intent of 
OPA 90 remains intact or is even facilitated.
80
  The political optics are too 
charged and the benefits too concentrated to generate legislative interest.
81
  
Therefore, if more natural gas companies push for deepwater LNG ports, 
the most likely avenue of resolution is either the Coast Guard or the courts. 
B. Text 
The primary text at issue is OPA 90.  However, understanding the 
applicability of OPA 90 to deepwater LNG ports also depends upon the 
                                                                                                                 
 75. See discussion infra Section III.0. 
 76. GULF OIL SPILL, THE SMITHSONIAN NATIONAL MUSEUM OF NATURAL HISTORY, 
http://ocean.si.edu/gulf-oil-spill (Last visited Oct. 16, 2015); see also Jay Angle et al., Legal 
Developments Since the Enactment of the Oil Spill Liability Act of 1990, Note, 19 PA. ST. 
ENVTL. L. REV. 403, 405 (2011). 
 77. GULF OIL SPILL, supra note 76. 
 78. H.R. REP. 101-241, pt. 1, at 30; H.R. REP. 101-241, pt. 2, at 9-10; S. REP. 101-94, 
at 2. 
 79. The major difference is between the fuel at issue, LNG, which has substantially 
different characteristics than oil.  Additionally, the wellhead in the Deepwater Horizon 
incident was nearly a mile below the surface whereas the pipeline for a deepwater LNG port 
would be only a few hundred feet below the surface. 
 80. See, e.g., Krop, supra note 59, at 249-50; Salo, supra note 31, at 81; Rascoe, supra 
note 65. 
 81. A public-choice grounded “transactional” view of the legislative process posits 
“continuous organized conflict” in such situations; Congress will produce no legislation or 
delegate to agency action.  See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE JR. ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON 
LEGISLATION AND REGULATION: STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY 43-48 
(2014).   
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purpose of the DWPA, which regulates deepwater ports, and the MTSA, 
which amended the DWPA to permit deepwater ports to handle LNG.  
Additionally, the Clean Water Act (“CWA”) exists alongside OPA 90, 
ensuring that discharges not covered by OPA 90 are still covered by law. 
1. The Oil Pollution Act of 1990   
OPA 90 is an extensive regulatory scheme to reduce the chances and 
mitigate the impact of a discharge of oil into the environment.  Reducing 
the likelihood of discharge occurs through regulations on the construction 
of oil tankers, pilotage requirements for oil tankers, mariner licensing 
requirements, and a communications equipment requirement.
82
  Mitigating 
the impact occurs by requiring operators to have oil spill response plans, 
ensuring that industries that handle oil have sufficient funds to meet 
liability requirements, and creating a fund
83
 to handle clean-up costs if a 
responsible party cannot be found or is insolvent.
84
 
OPA 90 contains specific provisions for deepwater ports.  The statute 
defines a deepwater port as a “facility licensed under the Deepwater Port 
Act of 1974 (33 U.S.C. 1501-1524).”
85
  Thus, for OPA 90 to apply to 
deepwater LNG ports, a port must be both licensed under the DWPA and a 
“facility” as defined by OPA 90.  OPA 90, 33 U.S.C. § 2701, defines 
“facility” as a  
structure [or group], equipment, or device (other than a vessel) 
which is used for one or more of the following purposes: 
exploring for, drilling for, producing, storing, handling, 
transferring, processing, or transporting oil . . . and includes any 
motor vehicle, rolling stock, or pipeline . . . .
86
     
The statute requires all facilities to maintain a certificate of financial 
responsibility (“COFR”) up to a statutory maximum to meet financial 
liability resulting from a spill.  A deepwater port must maintain a COFR up 
to its maximum limit of liability, which is approximately $373 million.
87
  
This limit is the highest imposed by the statute and equal only to onshore 
                                                                                                                 
 82. 33 U.S.C. §§ 2701-62 (2012); Oil Pollution Act of 1990, Pub. L. 101-380, § 2 (Aug. 
18, 1990). 
 83. The Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund, established by 26 U.S.C. § 9509 (2012) and 
maintained by the Coast Guard’s National Pollution Fund Center. 
 84. Oil Pollution Act of 1990, Pub. L. 101-380, 104 Stat. 484, § 2 (Aug. 18, 1990). 
 85. 33 U.S.C. § 2701(6). 
 86. 33 U.S.C. § 2701(9) (emphasis added). 
 87. 33 U.S.C. §§ 2704(a)(4), 2716(c)(2); 33 C.F.R. § 138.230. 
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  The Louisiana Offshore Oil Port, a deepwater port that handles 
the largest oil tankers in operation, has a liability limit of less than one 
quarter of that required for other deepwater ports.
89
  The secretary of the 
department in which the Coast Guard operates may lower the statutory 
minimum to $50 million through informal (notice-and-comment) 
rulemaking and after receiving a report regarding the risk of oil discharge 
from a deepwater port.
90
  This rulemaking has not occurred and is not 
planned.   
2. The Deepwater Port Act of 1974 and Subsequent Amendments   
The DWPA protects the maritime environment and coastal states from 
potential oil spills by regulating offshore facilities that transport oil.
91
  The 
introductory section of the original enactment declares that the DWPA’s 
purpose is to regulate deepwater ports and protect the marine 
environment.
92
  Later amendments in 1996 and 2002 expanded the purpose 
to include promoting construction of deepwater ports and promoting 
offshore oil and gas development.
93
   
The original DWPA applied only to facilities that transferred oil
94
 and 
specifically barred deepwater ports from handling anything but oil.
95
  Oil 
referred only to petroleum, crude oil, or any products refined from either;
96
 
thus, the original DWPA excluded natural gas.  Congress expanded the 
                                                                                                                 
 88. See 33 U.S.C. § 2704; 33 C.F.R. § 138.230; see also 33 U.S.C. § 2716 (showing that 
while the liability limits for a deepwater port and an onshore facility are equal, onshore 
facilities do not have to maintain a COFR). 
 89. 33 C.F.R. § 138.230; LOOP LLC, “About LOOP,” www.loopllc.com/About-
Loop/Story (last visited Nov. 5, 2015). 
 90. 33 U.S.C. § 2704(d)(2);  see also Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-
296, 116 Stat. 2135 (Nov. 25, 2002) (noting that, once adjusted for inflation, this lowered 
statutory minimum would be $53 million; since 2002, the Coast Guard has operated under 
the Department of Homeland Security). 
 91. Deepwater Port Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-627, 89 Stat. 2126 (Jan. 3, 1975), 
codified as 33 U.S.C. §§ 1501-24. 
 92. Id. 
 93. See Coast Guard Authorization Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-324, 110 Stat. 3901, 
§ 501-08 (Oct. 19, 1996) (adding these additional purposes); Maritime Transportation Act of 
2002, Pub. L. No. 107-295, 116 Stat. 2064, § 106 (Nov. 25, 2002) (adding “natural gas” 
after all references to oil); see also 33 U.S.C. § 1501(a)(5), (6) (2012) (expressing the 
amended purpose of the DPWA as promoting natural gas use).  
 94. Deepwater Port Act of 1974. 
 95. Id. § 4(a). 
 96. Id. § 3(14). 
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DWPA to permit importation of natural gas in 2002 through the MTSA.
97
  
In 2012 during the Energy Renaissance, Congress authorized deepwater 
ports to export natural gas.
98
  The DWPA, as amended, now both permits 
deepwater ports to be licensed to transport LNG exclusively and requires 
these ports to be licensed under its regime.
99
   
3. The Clean Water Act 
OPA 90 is not the only federal statute to regulate the discharge of oil into 
U.S. waters.he CWA concurrently governs discharges of hazardous waste 
into the ocean or navigable waters.
100
  Oil is specifically covered at length 
by 33 U.S.C § 1321.
101
  This section declares U.S. policy to be to eliminate 
all discharges of oil into navigable waters,
102
 prohibits discharge of oil into 







 penalties for oil discharges by a 
vessel or facility.  The CWA does not define “facility” and the OPA 90’s 
definition applies only to the OPA 90 sections of Title 33: §§ 2701-62.  
Liability limits are lower than those established under OPA 90, but remain 
a stilll a significant $50 million for offshore facilities.
106
  The CWA, 
including §1321, remains in force even after enactment of OPA 90; even if 
response costs for oil discharges are not covered under OPA 90, the federal 
government can still hold liable those who discharge oil into the water. 
  
                                                                                                                 
 97. Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-295, 116 Stat. 2064, 
§ 106 (Nov. 25, 2002); Deepwater Port Act of 1974, at § 3(1).  The original act and the act 
upon amendment in 2002 defined a deepwater port as a facility for the “transportation to any 
State . . . .” (Emphasis added.) 
 98. Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-213, 124 
Stat. 1540, § 312 (Dec. 20, 2012). 
 99. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1502(9), 1503 (2012). 
 100. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387.  The Clean Water Act is the colloquial name.  The statute 
is technically the Federal Water Pollution Control Act.  
 101. Id. § 1321 (2012). 
 102. Id. § 1321(b)(1). 
 103. Id. § 1321(b)(3). 
 104. Id. § 1321(b)(6). 
 105. Id. § 1321(b)(7). 
 106. 33 U.S.C. § 1321(f).  Although this articles argues that a deepwater LNG port is not 
a facility under OPA 90, it is nonetheless an offshore facility for purposes of the CWA. 
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Statutory interpreters, such as courts and regulatory agencies, approach 
interpretation generally using four interpretative models, or a combination 
thereof.  The primary approach is a textual approach, where the interpreter 
interprets the statute consistent with the plain meanings of the text, seeing 
the law as what was actually enacted and not what was potentially intended 
to be enacted.
107
  However, the courts sometimes look to interpret the 
statute consistent with the intent of the enacting legislature even if that 
interpretation is not fully reflected in the plain language, through 
examination of legislative history.
108
   A related approach is the purposive 
approach, where the interpreter tries to interpret the statute consistent with 
the general reasons underlying enactment.
109
  A final approach is the 
dynamic approach, where interpreters seek to balance the text, the 
enactment context, and the current context of the case, rather than favor one 
approach over the others.
110
   
Additionally, statutory interpreters also use guidelines – canons – to 
provide a more uniform approach to statutory interpretation.  Canons 
represent widely shared conventional pre-understandings about linguistic, 
procedural, and policy presumptions.  Canons of construction, as opposed 
to substantive canons, are neutral guides in interpreting ambiguous 
provisions.
111
  As guides, canons are persuasive authority to help resolve 
ambiguity.
112
  Relevant canons include interpreting provisions to avoid 
absurd results, defining one ambiguous word in a list consistent with the 
others in the list, utilizing the ordinary meaning of words unless specifically 
defined, considering the context of the entire act to inform the meaning of 
ambiguities, advising how to incorporate references to another statute when 
                                                                                                                 
 107. See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr., Gadamer/Statutory Interpretation, 90 COLUM. L. 
REV. 609, 610 (1990) (discussing the textualist approach); see also Kevin M. Stack, The 
Interpretative Dimension of Seminole Rock, 22 GEO. MASON L. REV. 669, 683 (2015). 
 108. Eskridge, Gadamer/Statutory Interpretation, supra note 107, at 611. 
 109. HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN 
THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW 1374 (William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey 
eds., 1994); Stack, supra note 107, at 683. 
 110. E.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr., Dynamic Statutory Interpretation, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 
1479, 1482-84 (1987) (seminal work on the dynamic approach). 
 111. E.g., Larry M. Eig, Statutory Interpretation: General Principles and Recent Trends 
4, Congressional Research Service (2011); Eskridge, Gadamer/Statutory Interpretation, 
supra note 107, at 633. 
 112. E.g., id. 
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that statute is amended, and interpreting statutory coverage expansively if 
designed to remediate specific problems.   
Courts will apply varying levels of deference to the agency’s 
interpretations of the law and its regulations, and agency determinations 
made pursuant to these.  Courts may also allow agencies to make minor 
exceptions to the law if benefits of application in certain circumstances are 
trivial.   
This article does not discuss the relative merits and critiques of each 
method or canon; rather, it examines OPA 90 consistent with each approach 
or canon to see how each would resolve the application of the deepwater 
port provision to natural gas.  It also examines what level of deference a 
court would afford and whether an agency determination of inapplicability 
would survive judicial scrutiny.  Sections III.C and IV.A provide detailed 
discussion on and application of these approaches, canons, and the varying 
degrees of deference. 
III. Current Application of The Oil Pollution Act to Offshore LNG Facilities  
OPA 90’s current applicability, as well as its COFR provision, to 
deepwater LNG ports is unclear.  All deepwater LNG ports have sought 
and, for those who were licensed to operate, received exemptions from 
OPA 90.  However, each decision was made on a case-by-case basis that 
affords no rule of general applicability.
113
  The lack of clarity may dissuade 
some companies from pursuing a deepwater port option, complicates the 
approval process for those that do, and increase the likelihood of litigation.  
It would also complicate adjudication if an applicability decision were ever 
challenged in court.  In short, the current state of the legal and regulatory 
reach is uncertain.  Given the potential for significant natural gas 
development, the uncertainty ought to be resolved before an unhappy party 
turns to the courts. 
A. Current Interpretation:  Your Gas is as Good as Mine 
OPA 90 applies to deepwater LNG ports because of the 2002 amendment 
to the DWPA.  Interpretation of the applicability rests upon the following 
question: Does OPA 90 apply to a deepwater port whose purpose is to 
transport only LNG, but where incidental to its operation, it may use small 
quantities of oil?   
There is no official Coast Guard interpretation, but current practice 
regarding the deepwater port licensing process appears to definitively say 
                                                                                                                 
 113. See discussion infra Section III.0. 
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yes, except for all applications thus received.    A 2009 interim rule implied 
that in general, OPA 90 applies to the licensing process for deepwater LNG 
ports, but due to specifics of the constructions of LNG ports reviewed, none 
met the criteria to be considered a facility.
114
  No rationale or standard was 
given; the rule merely stated that based on a case-by-case analysis, these 
deepwater LNG ports were not facilities.
115
  The Coast Guard implied that 
if more oil was used for fuel or servicing equipment, these deepwater ports 
may well be facilities, but gave no further clarity.
116
  The licensing approval 
for the Port Dolphin LNG facility granted in 2009 noted that because the 
port would “operate exclusively as a LNG deepwater port, and only small 
amounts of non-persistent oil would be stored and used to operate and 
maintain equipment, there would be little or no threat of an oil spill at the 
Port.”
117
 This reasoning implies that OPA 90 applies if a certain threshold 
of oil is present.  However, neither the statute nor regulations, nor any other 
agency determination specifies what quantity or usage triggers the 
requirement.  Yet two earlier licensing approvals initially required a 
deepwater LNG port operator to obtain a COFR to satisfy the OPA 90 
liability limit.
118




Judicial decisions oil the waters.  Decisions are sparse and appear in 
differing unreported district court decisions.  In United States v. Southern 
Pacific Transportation Co., a district court held that a freight train that 
discharged oil from its fuel tanks during derailment was not a facility per 
OPA 90.
120
  Even though “facility,” per the statute, is broad enough to 
                                                                                                                 
 114. Consumer Price Index Adjustment of Oil Pollution Act of 1990 Limits of Liability – 
Vessels and Deepwater Ports, 74 Fed. Reg. 31,357, 31,363 (interim rule with request for 
comment of July 1, 2009) (to be codified at 33 C.F.R. pt. 138); see also Consumer Price 
Index Adjustments of Oil Pollution Act of 1990 Limits of Liability – Vessels, Deepwater 
Ports and Onshore Facilities, 79 Fed. Reg. 49,206, 49,213, 49213 n.23 (proposed Aug. 19, 
2014) (to be codified at 33 C.F.R. pt. 138). 
 115. Id. 
 116. Consumer Price Index Adjustment of Oil Pollution Act of 1990 Limits of Liability – 
Vessels and Deepwater Ports, 74 Fed. Reg. 31,357, 31,363. 
 117. MATSUDA, DECISION ON PORT DOLPHIN, supra note 73, at 21. 
 118. SEAN T. CONNAUGHTON, LICENSE TO OWN, CONSTRUCT AND OPERATE A DEEPWATER 
PORT ISSUED TO NORTHEAST GATEWAY ENERGY BRIDGE L.L.C., 4, Annex D (May 14, 2007) 
[hereinafter CONNAUGHTON, LICENSE FOR NORTHEAST GATEWAY]; CONNAUGHTON, DECISION 
ON NEPTUNE LNG, supra note 73, at 18-19, 23-24. 
 119. See Letter from Daron T. Threet, supra note 7. 
 120. United States v. So. Pac. Trans. Co., No. 94-6176-HO., 1995 WL 84193, at *2 (D. 
Or. Feb. 20, 1995). 
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 the court held that OPA 90 is only applicable to the 
“commercial production and transportation of oil” and not to consumer 
use.
122
  Fourteen years later in Red River Farms v. United States, a different 
district court held that oil leaking from a fuel line to an irrigation pump did 
make the farm a responsible party under OPA 90, implicitly ignoring the 
consumer use of the oil.
123
  However, it is possible to reconcile the cases.  
In Southern Pacific, the locomotive was not used for the purposes of 
handling oil; oil was incidental, even if necessary, to the locomotive’s 
purpose of pulling train cars.  In Red River Farms, the fuel line was used 
for the purpose of transporting oil, qualifying it as a facility under OPA 90. 
A district court found the Coast Guard’s definition of facility to be 
“overly-broad” in United States v. Viking Resources Inc when the Coast 
Guard defined facility to include all structures within the geographic 
bounds of the defendant’s lease even though the statute limits liability to 
ownership operation.
124
  As the Viking court noted when determining what 
constitutes a facility, “there is virtually no applicable case law elaborating 
on this definition.
125
   
In summary, there is no published rule or standard that clarifies what 
amount of oil or what uses of oil trigger the application of OPA 90 to a 
deepwater port.  The only obtainable guidance is from inferences made 
from reading case-by-case determinations; these imply that OPA 90 does 
apply in principle to any facility that has oil present, but the COFR 
requirements are not triggered when a facility uses only minimal amounts 
of oil and perhaps when such minimal use is merely incidental to the 
facility’s purpose.  Judicial decisions are mixed on whether mere 
consumption of oil is dispositive, but the Coast Guard seems to reject that 
approach in favor of its case-by-case approach, apparently based on 
quantity or risk. 
  
                                                                                                                 
 121. 33 U.S.C. § 2701(9). 
 122. So. Pac. Trans. Co., 1995 WL 84193, at *2. 
 123. Red River Farms v. United States, No. CV 08-2078-PHX-NVW, 2009 WL 
2983195, at *1-2 (D. Ariz. Sept. 17, 2009). 
 124. United States v. Viking Res. Inc., 607 F. Supp. 2d 808, 816-17 (S.D. Tex. 2009).  
The court denied the government’s summary judgment motion because the government 
failed to show no material dispute existed on whether the defendant owned or operated 
certain structures.  For an onshore facility, merely leasing the land upon which pre-existing 
structures existed was insufficient for liability and the defendant disputed some of the 
structures grouped by the government into the “facility.”  
 125. Id. at 816 n.24. 
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B. Problems with the Current Interpretation 
The implications of interpreting the applicability of OPA 90 to 
deepwater ports are not merely academic.  Several LNG deepwater ports 
have been constructed or proposed; all have sought and, for those where 
MARAD approve the license, received exemptions from the COFR before 
proceeding with construction.  Finding that OPA 90 does apply comes with 
an onerous requirement to maintain $373 million of free cash or insuring to 
that amount, a heavy counterbalance to the benefits of a deepwater location.     
The Coast Guard’s practice has been to examine each application on a 
case-by-case basis, and it has found that the deepwater LNG ports in each 
application were not “facilities” per OPA 90, and thus the statute is 
inapplicable.
126
 However, the rationale for these determinations is unclear.  
Is it that these facilities do not handle or store oil despite using it because 
the purpose of these facilities is unrelated to oil?  Or, is it a practical 
decision that recognizes as illogical a financial requirement far in excess of 
the risk against which the requirement is meant to insure?  The descriptions 
given by the Coast Guard in July 2009, when it sought to increase the 
liability limit because of inflation, inclined towards the first reason.
127
 
However, both the reason cited in the October 2009 approval decision for 
Neptune LNG and the brief mention in 2014 when the Coast Guard sought 
to increase the liability limit inclined towards the second reason.
128
 
Inapplicability because these ports do not handle oil is a defensible reading 
of the statute.  Inapplicability because of low risk is questionable.  The 
statute neither sets an applicability threshold, nor gives permission to grant 
exemptions, nor permits adjusting COFR requirements or limiting liability 
based on overall risks.  Perhaps the decision relies on the de minimis 
exemption,
129
 but that rationale is unstated. 
The reason for the ambiguity might be uncertainty over the applicability 
of the law or a desire for flexibility.  Stating that the act excludes deepwater 
                                                                                                                 
 126. Consumer Price Index Adjustment of Oil Pollution Act of 1990 Limits of Liability – 
Vessels and Deepwater Ports, 74 Fed. Reg. 31,357, 31,363. 
 127. Id. 
 128. Consumer Price Index Adjustments of Oil Pollution Act of 1990 Limits of Liability 
– Vessels, Deepwater Ports and Onshore Facilities, 79 Fed. Reg. 49206, 49213, 49213 n.23; 
MATSUDA, DECISION ON PORT DOLPHIN, supra note 73, at  21.  The Coast Guard issued its 
decision in August 2008. 
 129. The exemption allows agencies to not apply certain statutory provisions if 
application would have trivial benefits and would result in pointless expenditures.  Courts 
imply applicability absent explicit contrary guidance.  See discussion of the doctrine infra 
Section IV.C.0. 
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LNG ports might set the precedent for excluding other facilities, leading to 
unintended consequences.  Stating that the act includes deepwater LNG 
ports even if the presence of oil is minimal and incidental, but then granting 
an exemption may be a practical accommodation.  This interpretation is 
contrary to the text of OPA 90.  OPA 90 has neither a waiver provision nor 
does it apply financial assurance requirements on a risk-based approach; if 
the act applies, the COFR requirement applies, and the amount required is 
the statutory maximum.
130
  While larger companies may be able to set aside 
the necessary cash or acquire insurance to cover the COFR requirement,
131
 
smaller ones would likely be precluded.  But for small and large entities 
alike, another alternative is to continue to locate LNG terminals onshore or 
to not build additional facilities.  Unlike vessels, offshore facilities, and 
deepwater ports, onshore facilities have no COFR requirement.
132
   
The absence of a COFR requirement does not mean that onshore 
facilities are exempt from liability for oil discharges.  Onshore facilities 
remain subject to the CWA and to same $373 million liability limit as 
deepwater ports,
133
 except their maximum liability can be reduced through 
informal rulemaking to $8 million based on risk.  At issue is not whether 
deepwater LNG ports can or should be held liable for unauthorized 
discharges of oil; per the CWA, they will be.
134
  Rather, the issue is simply 
whether deepwater LNG ports should be subject to a COFR requirement 
originally designed for a port handling incomparably greater quantities of 
oil, especially when other regulated entities that handle incomparably 
greater quantities of oil have lower liability limits and lower or no COFR 
requirement. 
Deepwater LNG port operators need predictability and guidance prior to 
engaging in the costly approval process.  Currently, no standard upon which 
to plan exists and decisions appear arbitrary and confusing.  Given the 
substantial resources in question, if a deepwater LNG application is not 
                                                                                                                 
 130. 33 U.S.C. §§ 2704(a)(3), 2716(c)(2).  33 U.S.C. § 2704(d)(2)(C) does permit the 
Secretary of Homeland Security to reduce the liability limit for deepwater ports to not less 
than $50 million, but such as reduction has not yet occurred nor is expected, nor does the 
statute allow for case-by-case reductions or waivers or give such authority to the Coast 
Guard. 
 131. E.g., CONNAUGHTON, LICENSE FOR NORTHEAST GATEWAY, supra note 118, at 4, 
Annexes C & D. 
 132. 33 U.S.C. § 2716. 
 133. Id. § 2704(a)(4).   
 134. Id. § 1321.   
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exempted, a lawsuit will likely ensue.
135
  However, if an exemption is 
granted, there is also a possibility of legal challenge.
136
   
How is a deepwater LNG port applicant or a court to know what to do?  
Neither past deepwater LNG port licensing decisions nor court rulings 
provide clear guidance upon which potential LNG operators can plan or 
future courts can rely.  An applicant will have to guess based on similarity 
of its designs and the quantity and use of oil as compared to previously-
approved designs.  The sparse judicial decisions are mixed and do not 
directly address the issue.  The two more applicable decisions are 
unpublished district court decisions.
137
   
Due to a decade of unresolved confusion and the high stakes, the issue 
should be addressed definitively.  It is highly unlikely that Congress will 
amend the statute.  As the lead regulatory agency, the Coast Guard is 
positioned best to resolve the confusion; it could use its authority to 
interpret the statute definitively.  Otherwise, all interested parties roll the 
judicial dice.  Nevertheless, resolving to answer the question requires 
knowing which answer is best. 
C. Judicial Deference to the Current Interpretation 
Federal courts afford great deference to an agency’s interpretation of 
statutes for which the agency is responsible.  The Supreme Court expressed 
this deference in Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resource Defense 
Council, Inc.,
138
 where it established a two-step inquiry for review of 
agency determinations.
139
  The first step is to see if Congress has “directly 
spoken to the precise question at issue;” if Congress clearly expressed its 
intent, then the court and the agency must effectuate Congress’s will.
140
  If, 
however, Congress has not directly addressed the question, then the court 
must defer to the agency’s reasonable interpretation of the statute.
141
 
However, the Court clarified scope of this rule in United States v. Mead 
                                                                                                                 
 135. As all proposed deepwater LNG ports have received exemptions or were cancelled 
for other reasons, this has yet to be tested. 
 136. While the COFR requirement has yet to be used as a weapon to thwart projects, 
environmental groups or environmental interest have had some success in blocking 
deepwater LNG port construction.  See discussion supra Section I.0.  Alternatively, 
protectionist groups may sue to make the statute applicable under the belief that it protects 
domestic consumers. 
 137. See discussion supra III.0. 
 138. 467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
 139. Id. at 842-43. 
 140. Id.  
 141. Id. at 843-44. 
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 the Chevron inquiry applies only to situations where Congress 
intended for an agency’s determinations to have the force of law.
143
  
Formality of the interpretative process, such as in a rulemaking process 
with its notice-and-comment requirement, or specific delegation in the 
statute would lead a court towards finding a “force of law” intent and 
applying Chevron deference.
144
   
When an agency interpretation falls outside of Chevron, Chevron’s 
predecessor, Skidmore v. Swift & Co. captures the fall-through cases.
145
 
Under Skidmore, agency interpretations remain, “entitled to respect.”
146
 The 
deference afforded depends upon the thoroughness of the agency’s 
consideration, the “validity of its reasoning,” consistency with earlier and 
later decisions, and the reasoning’s persuasive power.
147
 
If a party ever challenges the Coast Guard’s decision in court, which 
deference should a court apply to the interpretation?  With a circuitous 
application of COFR requirements to deepwater LNG ports caused by 
incorporation by an amended reference, it remains unlikely that a Court will 
find that Congress directly spoke to the issue.  Thus, the question becomes 
one of reasonableness, but under the Chevron or Skidmore standard?  After 
Mead, it appears that Skidmore applies since the Coast Guard’s 
interpretation is hardly formal;
148
 instead of a rulemaking or official 
interpretation of the statute, the Coast Guard decides COFR applicability to 
deepwater LNG port applications on a case-by-case basis and against no 
clear articulated standard.
149
  Given terse explanation for finding the COFR 
requirement inapplicable in past applications, a court has little to work with 
concerning thoroughness, reasoning, or persuasion.
150
 While continued 
exemptions from the COFR requirement would at least be consistent with 
earlier decisions, a contrary decision would be ripe for challenge and 
                                                                                                                 
 142. United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218 (2001). 
 143. Id. at 226-27. 
 144. Id. at 231. 
 145. 323 U.S. 134 (1944). 
 146. Id. at 140. 
 147. Id.  
 148. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. at 226-27, 231. 
 149. Deference under Skidmore is based upon the thoroughness of the agency’s 
consideration, the “validity of its reasoning,” consistency with earlier and later decisions, 
and the reasoning’s persuasive power.  Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 140.  For the case-by-case 
decision process and limited rationale, see Consumer Price Index Adjustment of Oil 
Pollution Act of 1990 Limits of Liability – Vessels and Deepwater Ports, 74 Fed. Reg. 
31,357, 31,363. 
 150. Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 140. 
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judicial invalidation.  Yet, a court interpreting this remedial statute 
liberally
151
 could also find that the COFR requirement should apply, 
especially given the absence of justification for inapplicability.  Even 
approved facilities granted the exemption could then find the requirement 
imposed long after making large capital investments in reliance of the 
requirement’s inapplicability.   
IV. A Sound Interpretation of the OPA 90 COFR Requirement 
While several schools of thought regarding statutory interpretation exist, 
interpreters, whether the courts or administrative agencies, must interpret 
statutes consistent with the intent of the legislature. As deepwater LNG 
ports were included in the DWPA though a 2002 amendment, there are four 
possible intents. First, Congress intended that deepwater LNG facilities be 
licensed under the DWPA, fully aware that OPA 90 might apply to such 
facilities despite their not handling oil. Second, Congress did not know that 
OPA 90 would capture deepwater LNG ports, but Congress focused more 
on eliminating oil pollution than incentivizing the transportation of LNG, so 
OPA 90 should apply if the facility uses any oil. Third, Congress amended 
the DWPA to incentivize maritime transportation of LNG without realizing 
that OPA 90 would apply, and having no intent to have it apply. Fourth, 
Congress knew of the reference to the DWPA by OPA 90 at the time of 
amendment but thought the issue irrelevant because no agency would find a 
natural gas facility covered by an oil pollution statute. For the purposes of 
this argument, the first and second possibilities are a distinction without a 
difference, as are the third and fourth. Either Congress intended for OPA 90 
to apply or it did not; the Coast Guard and the courts must effectuate 
whichever possibility reflects Congressional intent. 
A. Interpretation of the COFR Requirement 
1. The Text of OPA 90 – You Can Handle the Truth 
The textualist approach interprets statutes based on the common meaning 
of the words used at the time of enactment.  The idea is to identify an 
objective intent based on the text of the statute.  What Congress intended is 
what Congress enacted. The approach focuses on the original meaning of 
the text to obtain intent to the exclusion of non-statutory indicators, such as 
legislative history.
152
 Textualists eschew legislative history because they are 
                                                                                                                 
 151. See discussion infra Section IV.A.0. 
 152. See Michael Rosensaft, The Role of Purposivism in the Delegation of Rulemaking 
Power to the Courts, 29 VT. LAW. REV. 611, 613 (2005); Jennifer M. Brandy, Note, 
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skeptical that there is such a thing a single intent for such a diverse body.
153
  
Rather, textual ambiguities should first be addressed using dictionaries from 
the enactment period, grammar rules, the structure of the statute and related 
provisions, and interpretative canons.
154
   
The Ordinary Meaning canon directs that unless a statute defines a term, 
a specialized term of art definition exists, or the term has an accepted legal 
meaning, interpreters should assume that the statute used the word in its 
ordinary – or dictionary – meaning at the time of enactment.
155
 When 
multiple definitions admit to a word, the choice of appropriate definitions 
limited by context as informed by the rest of the statute.
156
 
The Whole Act canon advises interpreters to interpret provisions not in 
isolation, but in the context of the entire statute.
157
 The interpreter assumes 
that the statute is a coherent work, and looks to other provisions or uses of 
words or phrases to resolve the current ambiguity.
158
 The text of one part of 
the statute should be used to elucidate ambiguities in other parts.
159
 
Corollaries include using the title and textual statements of purpose of the 
statute; while neither generally can limit clear statutory language, they can 
be employed to resolve ambiguities.
160
 An additional corollary is the rule 
against surplusage, which presumes that every word or phrase in a statute 
adds something new; courts should not construe provisions to be repetitive 
or redundant.
161
   
From a plain reading of the text, does the language fairly indicate that 
COFR requirements designed for deepwater oil ports apply to deepwater 
                                                                                                                 
Interpretative Freedom: A Necessary Component of Article III Judging, 61 DUKE L.J. 651, 
655-56 (2011). 
 153. See, e.g., Rosensaft, supra note 152, at 626-27; Frank H. Easterbrook, Text, History, 
and Structure in Statutory Interpretation, 17 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 61, 62-63 (1994). 
 154. Eskridge, Jr., Gadamer/Statutory Interpretation, supra note 107, at 610; Brandy, 
supra note 152, at 655-56. 
 155. See Eig, supra note 111, at 6-7; see also Watson v. United States, 552 U.S. 74, 79 
(2007) (holding that absent a specialized or defined meaning, word interpretation “must turn 
on the language as we normally speak it”). 
 156. See Eig, supra note 111, at 7-8. 
 157. E.g., Eskridge, Jr., Gadamer/Statutory Interpretation, supra note 107, at 663. 
 158. Id. 
 159. See Eig, supra note 111, at 3-4. 
 160. E.g., ESKRIDGE, CASES AND MATERIALS, supra note 81, at 676; John F. Manning, 
The Absurdity Doctrine, 116 HARV. L. REV. 2387, 2434-35 & n.179 (2003); Eig, supra note 
111, at 33-34. 
 161. E.g., Morell E. Mullins, Sr., Tools, Not Rules: The Heuristic Nature of Statutory 
Interpretation, 30 J. LEGIS. 1, 11 n.38 (2003); Eig, supra note 111, at 13-14. 
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LNG ports that use minimal amounts of oil incidental to their LNG 
operations? The question appears deceptively simple.   
The COFR requirement turns on the interpretation of the “facility” 
definition.  A deepwater port is subject to the COFR requirement if it is a 
facility licensed “under the DWPA of 1974 (33 U.S.C. 1501-1524).”
162
 A 
deepwater LNG port is licensed under the DWPA, as amended.
163
  
Assuming 33 U.S.C. § 2701 incorporates the amended DWPA,
164
 a textual 
analysis requires determining whether a deepwater LNG port is a facility.  
The statute defines “facility” for the purposes of the act as a structure, 
equipment, or device “used for one or more of the following purposes: 
exploring for, drilling for, producing, storing, handling, transferring, 
processing, or transporting oil.”
165
 Deepwater LNG ports are not used to 
explore for, drill for, produce, transport, or process oil. Transferring, 
storing, and handling, however, may give some pause. When statutes group 
words in a list like here, the Noscitur a Sociis canon advises that an 
interpreter should give all words a related meaning.
166
 Thus, one word with 
divergent definitions can be constrained, its ambiguity reduced, by ensuring 
consistency with less ambiguous terms. In general, the interpreter finds the 
common thread that unites the words and applies it to all. 
“Transferring” and “storing” seems inapplicable. Transferring generally 
connotes the passing of an object from one person or object to another, 
especially in the context of a commercial transaction.
167
 While a deepwater 
LNG port may use oil, and while oil must be transferred to it for its use, a 
deepwater LNG port neither transfers oil to another object nor is it used to 
affect any transfer. Plus, any oil transferred to the deepwater port happens 
incidental to its  purpose. Storing connotes the keeping of a thing for safe 
custody, where the intent is to hold until future delivery rather than to 
consume or sell.
168
 The oil present in deepwater LNG ports is for use, and 
not for future transportation or sale.
169
 However, the common usage of 
                                                                                                                 
 162. 33 U.S.C. § 2701(6). 
 163. Id. § 1502(9), (13). 
 164. See discussion infra Section IV.C.2. 
 165. 33 U.S.C. § 2701(9). 
 166. See Eig, supra note 111, at 10-11. 
 167. Transfer, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014); Transfer, BALLETINE’S LAW 
DICTIONARY (3d ed. 2010).  
 168. Store, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014); see also Store, BALLETINE’S LAW 
DICTIONARY (3d ed. 2010); Store, OXFORD AMERICAN DICTIONARY (3d ed. 2010). 
 169. Consumer Price Index Adjustment of Oil Pollution Act of 1990 Limits of Liability – 
Vessels and Deepwater Ports, 74 Fed. Reg. 31,357, 31,363; see also MATSUDA, DECISION ON 
PORT DOLPHIN, supra note 73, at 21.  However, for an initial contrary position, changed by 
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“storing” might also include holding for one’s later use, in which case trace 
amounts of oil held on site to replenish oil as equipment uses it might 
constitute storing.  Yet, to qualify as a facility, the deepwater LNG port 
must not just store oil, its purpose must be to store oil.  Deepwater LNG 
ports are not used to store oil; any oil stored is incidental to its purpose of 
transferring LNG. 
“Handling” encompasses the broadest range of definitions among the 
terms.  “Handle” could connote a more commercial meaning
170
 or a more 
general holding or moving something.
171
  One could argue that the drafters 
intended “handle” to be a catch-all term, but drafters generally do not place 
such catch-alls in the middle of the activity list.  Under the Noscitur a 
Sociis canon, commercial activity appears as a unifying theme among all 
eight activities listed. While storing, handling, transferring, or transporting 
oil could refer to either commercial or non-commercial activities, acts of 
storing and transporting would more likely be commonly understood to 
imply some commercial activity. Exploring for, drilling for, producing, or 
processing oil clearly implicates commercial activity. With four of the list 
clearly demonstrating commercial activity and two others favoring 
commercial activity, the remaining two terms should also be interpreted to 
follow in the commercial vein.
172
 Handle may well be a broad, catch-all 
term, but still be confined to commercial activity. A commercial activity 
theme inheres oil as the primary object of the action as opposed to oil 
serving an incidental and minimal function, and therefore, would argue 
against application of the COFR requirement. 
Finally, the qualifying phrases may carry significant value in how the 
statue relates to deepwater LNG ports. The facility, to be covered by the 
act, must be “used for one or more of the following purposes . . .”
173
  
                                                                                                                 
the time of the drafting of 74 Fed. Reg. 31363 in 2009, see CONNAUGHTON, DECISION ON 
NEPTUNE LNG, supra note 73, at 18-19 (finding in the initial approval decision that OPA 90 
and the COFR requirement was applicable). 
 170. See, e.g., Handle, BALLETINE’S LAW DICTIONARY (3d ed. 2010); Handle, OXFORD 
AMERICAN DICTIONARY (3d ed. 2010). 
 171. See, e.g., Handle, BALLETINE’S LAW DICTIONARY (3d ed. 2010); Handle, 
WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY (2002). 
 172. The court in So. Pacific Trans. Co. came to a similar conclusion, but under a 
different canon.  United States v. So. Pac. Trans. Co., No. 94-6176-HO., 1995 WL 84193, at 
*2 (D. Or. Feb. 20, 1995) (finding because the enumerated purposes in the definition of 
facility “evidence a congressional intent that the OPA apply to . . . commercial production 
and transportation of oil,” the omission of consumer use means that consumer use is outside 
the scope of OPA 90). 
 173. 33 U.S.C. § 2701(9) (emphasis added). 
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Deepwater LNG ports are not “used for” any oil-related purpose, and 
therefore the subsequent list of actions should be held inapplicable. Can it 
be fairly reasoned that the incidental presence of oil satisfies the 
requirement that the port is used for the purpose of storing or handling oil?  
Rather, a plain reading of the statutorily enumerated activities reveals that 
each  have oil as the object of the activity, and not merely present. 
Applying the Whole Act canon, classifying a deepwater LNG port as a 
facility remains unsupported when considering the definition in the greater 
context of the remainder of the act, especially the sections on liability limits 
and COFR requirements, which differ depending on the type of facility or 
vessels. The act covers two main categories of oil-holding things: vessels 
and facilities.
174
 The act distinguishes between types of vessels and 
facilities for liability limits and COFR requirements; those that pose the 
highest risk have the highest liability.
175
 Small vessels and onshore facilities 
have no COFR requirements, the first likely due to low risk and the second 
likely due to assets and people that can be readily seized.
176
 Offshore 
facilities only require a COFR if the worst-case discharge exceeds 1,000 
barrels.
177
 Application of the COFR requirement means that a TI 
supertanker, the largest in operation and carrying 3.1 million barrels of oil, 
would have a maximum liability limit and COFR requirement similar to a 
deepwater LNG port handling a million times fewer barrels of oil.
178
 
Finally, the statute authorizes lowering the liability limit for deepwater 
ports “in connection with the transportation of oil” to $53 million.
179
 While 
deepwater ports handling oil meet eligibility requirements for reduced 
liability, deepwater ports handling LNG would not be so eligible.  Thus, 
subjecting a deepwater LNG port handling a few barrels of oil to a COFR 
and liability requirement in excess of  those imposed on onshore oil storage 
facilities or supertankers seems like a questionable holistic reading of the 
textual requirements.      
                                                                                                                 
 174. Id. § 2702(a) (“each responsible party for a vessel or a facility from which oil is 
discharged”). 
 175. Id. §§ 2704, 2716. 
 176. Id. § 2716. 
 177. Id. § 2716(c)(1)(A). 
 178. See HELLESPONT TARA – IMO 9235268, http://www.shipspotting.com/gallery/photo. 
php?lid=673543 (last visited Jan. 3, 2016).  33 U.S.C. § 2704(a)(1) imposes a liability of 
$1,900 per gross ton for double-hull tank vessels, which equates to approximately $450 
million.  The COFR requirement is approximately $370 million. 
 179. 33 U.S.C. § 2704(d)(2)(C).  $53 million is an inflation adjusted approximation of 
the statutory $50 million. 
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2. The Purpose of OPA 90 and the DWPA Amendment – Reduce Oil 
Pollution 
The purposive approach looks to interpret statutory provisions consistent 
with the underlying reasons for enactment.  The approach “looks at the aim 
of the statute first and only then applies it to the words that were 
enacted.”
180
 A court may identify the problem that the legislature intended 
to solve as one method of identifying purpose absent specific statutory 
declaration.
181
  Purpose may be also identified though several sources, such 
as the text of the statute itself (especially if it contains a statement of the 
purpose), or by examining the statute in its entirety, considering the 
legislative process and compromises in that process, using legislative 
history, and even consulting related case law.
182
 Once the court ascertains 
the purpose, it would determine the text of the statute to best effectuate that 
purpose, but without giving the words a meaning “they will not bear, or . . . 
which would violate any established policy of clear statement.”
183
 However, 
words should not be given a meaning that the purpose will not bear.
184
   
Do the requirements that deepwater LNG ports to maintain a $373 
million COFR to ensure the ability to pay for cleanup costs within the 
purpose of OPA 90 and the MTSA amendment to the DWPA make sense 
when these ports contain minimal quantities of oil incidental to their natural 
gas purpose? Examining the problem targeted by OPA 90, the enactment 
sought to reduce the chances of the discharge of oil into the marine 
environment and to mitigate the impact of a discharge. Evidence does not 
exist that these laws exist to restrict natural gas transportation or even 
subject the natural gas industry to such detailed regulation. This purpose 
clearly follows from examination of the text of congressional reports on the 
act, a holistic reading of the new statutory requirements, and the proximity 
of enactment to the EXXON VALDEZ accident.
185
 
The various House and Senate reports on the bills that would eventually 
comprise OPA 90 clearly identify the problem the Act addresses. “What the 
                                                                                                                 
 180. Rosensaft, supra note 152, at 612. 
 181. 2B SUTHERLAND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 54:4 (Norman Singer, ed., 7th ed. 
2015) [hereinafter SUTHERLAND]; see also, e.g., Eskridge, Gadamer/Statutory Interpretation, 
supra note 107, at 667; Stack, supra note 107, at 683. 
 182. See Rosensaft, supra note 152, at 623. 
 183. HART, supra note 109, at 1374. 
 184. See, e.g., STEPHEN BREYER, ACTIVE LIBERTY 85 (2005). 
 185. The statute as codified contains 11 references to the Exxon Valdez oil spill, 
including several provisions to respond directly to the spill and the area damaged.  33 U.S.C. 
§§ 2701-62. 
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Nation needs is a package of complementary . . . laws that will adequately 
compensate victims of oil spills, provide quick, efficient cleanup, minimize 
damage to [natural resources] and internalize those costs within the oil 
industry and its transportation sector,” proclaimed the Senate Committee on 
Environment and Public Works (“S. E&PW”).
186
 S. E&PW also noted that 
their proposed bill would increase liability for the oil industry to encourage 
them to invest in greater prevention and response.
187
 Reports of the Senate 
Commerce, Science, and Transportation Committee (“S. CS&T”)
188
 and the 
House Committee on Public Works and Transportation (“H. PW&T”)
189
 
reflect similar themes.   
All related acts specifically cite the EXXON VALDEZ oil spill and 
several other smaller contemporary spills as the motivation for this spate of 
legislative activity. H. PW&T’s bill identified the “need for legislation” as 
“the oil spill problem” and “inadequate” response capabilities, and then 
proceeded to discuss these problems over seven pages.
190
 Concurrent with 
these major spills Congress recognized the insufficiencies of the CWA 
provisions to address major spills.
191
 For example, H. PW&T identified the 
primary problem as large spills (of more than 1,200 barrels) “caused 
primarily by tanker and barge accidents.”
192
 S. CS&T expressed similar 
                                                                                                                 
 186. S. REP. NO. 101-94, at 2.  The committee also noted it has “long been concerned 
with the potential environmental dangers posed by the transportation, storage, and handling 
of oil.”  Id. at 1.    
 187. Id. at 3-4 (noting also that an 1851 Act still in force limits the liability of vessel 
owners to the value of the cargo, which is far below the economic and environmental 
damage caused by a large oil spill). 
 188. S. REP. NO. 101-99, at 1-3 (1989) (The bill imposes “new requirements on the 
operations of oil tankers . . . .”  There is a “need to improve the ability to prevent future 
spills and minimize the damage cause . . . when they occur.”) 
 189. H.R. REP. NO. 101-241, pt. 1, at 29-30 (The bill “provides a comprehensive 
legislative framework to prevent the spilling of oil into the waters . . . and to improve our 
preparedness and ability to respond to an oil spill . . . and assesses significant liability upon 
the spillers of oil and the oil industry” to incentivize prevention.); H.R. REP. NO. 101-241, pt. 
2, at 7 (identifying four purposes of the bill, including a comprehensive liability system, a 
fund to pay for damages, improvements to oil pollution prevention and response, and 
research on prevention and mitigation); H.R. REP. NO. 101-242, pt. 1, at 27-29 (1989) 
(repeating the same introductory language as H.R. REP. NO. 101-241).   
 190. H.R. REP. NO. 101-241, pt. 2, at 8-16. 
 191. Sump, supra note 11, at 1103-04. 
 192. H.R. REP. NO. 101-241, pt. 2, at 8-9 (noting that of the 9,000 to 12,100 spills that 
occurred each year between 1973 and 1984, only a handful accounted for the majority of oil 
spilled).   
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views a month earlier.
193
 The financial responsibility requirement of the 
final Act specifically targets these larger spills; the Act only covered 
vessels over 300 gross tons, vessels shipping oil, offshore facilities with 
discharge potential is greater than 1,000 barrels of oil, and deepwater 
ports.
194
 OPA 90 gives a deepwater port the highest liability limit almost 
certainly because of the huge quantities of oil Congress expected it to 
handle. 
The structure of OPA 90 reflects a purpose of mitigating the impact of 
oil in the marine environment. Its first operative provision creates a strict 
liability regime for oil discharges into the water,
195
 but subsequent 
provisions limit liability and permit downwards adjustments
196
 and create a 
financial responsibility requirement for certain potential responsible 
parties.
197
  Subsequent provisions of the Act also include tighter regulations 
on licensing mariners, pilotage, and vessel manning;
198
 new safety and 
communication equipment;
199
 a requirement to phase-out single hull 
vessels;
200
 response planning and management oversight;
201
 and improved 
transit management in Prince William Sound.
202
 The only content that 
touches on banning the use of oil or gas was a temporary moratorium on oil 
and gas development off the North Carolina coast.
203
  
The proposed bills and the final product addressed oil pollution not by 
banning or limiting the use or transportation of oil, but by requiring oil 
companies to internalize the cost of oil spills and thereby incentivize better 
prevention and response. OPA 90 as a whole aims to reduce oil spills and 
mitigate their consequences, while the liability limit
204
 and financial 
responsibility
205
 provisions incentivize the oil industry to take effective 
                                                                                                                 
 193. S. REP. NO. 101-99, at 1-3 (“Since 1976, there have been ten major production or 
transportation accidents that have released almost 50 million gallons of oil into the United 
States.”). 
 194. 33 U.S.C. § 2716. 
 195. Oil Pollution Act of 1990, § 1002; 33 U.S.C. § 2702 (2012) (those responsible for 
discharging oil are liable for cleanup costs and damages). 
 196. Oil Pollution Act of 1990, § 1004; 33 U.S.C. § 2704 (2012). 
 197. Oil Pollution Act of 1990, § 1016; 33 U.S.C. § 2716. 
 198. Oil Pollution Act of 1990, §§ 4101-08, 4114, 4116. 
 199. Id. at §§ 4110, 4113, 4118. 
 200. Id. at § 4115. 
 201. Id. at §§ 5001-07. 
 202. Id. at §§ 4101-08, 4114, 4116. 
 203. Id. at § 6003. 
 204. Id. at § 1004; 33 U.S.C. § 2704 (2012). 
 205. Id. at § 1016; 33 U.S.C. § 2716. 
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preventative and response measures.  The purpose was not to terminate the 
oil industry, much less obstruct the natural gas industry. More generally, the 
purpose was to reduce the impact of oil on the marine environment. Given 
the environmental benefits of natural gas compared to oil, incentivizing 
LNG use would be consistent with the Act’s purpose of reducing oil 
pollution into the water.  But did the MTSA intend to alter this purpose? 
Title I of the MTSA, which amended the DWPA, attempted to secure 
maritime infrastructure. The MTSA consists of numerous findings that 
detail the importance and vulnerability of maritime facilities.
206
 For 
example, Congress noted that the United States is “increasingly dependent 
on imported energy . . . and a disruption . . . would seriously harm 
consumers and the economy,” and that port facilities are vulnerable to 
terrorism.
207
   
While Congress began drafting the MTSA prior to the attacks of 2001, 
Congress only included the DWPA natural gas amendment subsequent to 
the attack.
208
 In fact, the pre- and post- attack drafts looked substantially 
different; the alterations demonstrate a shift to preventing terrorist attacks 
against maritime infrastructure.
209
The original act focused on criminal acts 
at ports; it mentions terrorism a mere seven times
210
 and contains only one 
operative provision relating to anti-terrorism measures.
211
 The remaining 
references appear as either brief mentions in the “Findings” section or a 
requirement for the Coast Guard to submit a report on maritime security 
and terrorism.
212
 In contrast, the Act as revised in the wake of September 
11, 2001, mentions terrorism 34 times
213
 and contains several anti-terrorism 
provisions including extensive new port security requirements, a sea-
marshal program, cargo screening and identification procedures, and more 
resources for the Coast Guard to perform new counterterrorism missions.
214
   
The conference report contains the only discussion regarding the DWPA 
natural gas amendment.  Congress expressed that the purpose of the 
amendment was to “enable the timely development of offshore natural gas 
                                                                                                                 
 206. Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-295, 116 Stat. 2064, 
§ 101 (Nov. 25, 2002). 
 207. Id. at § 101(4), (7), (10), (12). 
 208. Compare the original act as presented in the Senate on 20 July, 2001, S. 1214, 107th 
Cong., Cong. Rec. S8015-23, to the final act, Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002. 
 209. Id. 
 210. S. 1214, 107th Cong., Cong. Rec. S8015-23. 
 211. Id. at § 6. 
 212. Id. at §§ 2, 12. 
 213. Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002. 
 214. Id. at §§ 102, 105, 107, 111, 348. 
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 Further, it explicitly mentions that the amendment will allow 
deepwater ports to solely handle natural gas, something previously 
forbidden.
216
 Given fears of energy insecurity and terrorism directed at 
critical infrastructure coupled with a language that supports expanding the 
use of natural gas, it is safe to say that the DWPA amendment sought to 
expand domestic use of natural gas and site natural gas facilities away from 
population centers. The MTSA had no intention to subject natural gas 
facilities to the regulatory scheme of OPA 90. 
3. The Intent of the Legislators – To Prevent and Mitigate Future Major 
Oil Spills 
Legislative intent looks to the reasons of the enacting legislatures for 
enacting certain provisions.  If an ambiguity exists in the statutory 
language, the interpreter seeks to identify what the enacting legislature 
meant to do with the provisions or remedies it employed.
217
  Similar to the 
purposive approach, interpreters would use legislative history to interpret 




Examining the intent of Congress based on the legislative history and 
statements by members of Congress, did Congress intend to subject 
deepwater LNG ports to the COFR requirement designed for deepwater oil 
ports when it amended the DWPA though the MTSA, thereby bringing 
deepwater LNG ports under OPA 90’s requirements?  Little evidence 
suggests that Congress so intended; rather, the intent of Congress appears to 
be to expand the use of natural gas, including through deepwater ports. 
Congress enacted OPA 90 in the wake of the EXXON VALDEZ oil spill 
in Alaska and several other significant oil spills. Legislators introducing 
their bills in both the House and Senate make repeated reference to these 
spills and how this congress will put an “end to these environmental 
disasters.”
219
 These introductions and debate identified stricter shipping 
requirements, requirements for cleanup plans, financial liability for cleanup 
                                                                                                                 
 215. Joint Explanatory Statement of the Committee of Conference, H.R. REP. NO. 107-
777, § 106, at 85-86 (2002) (Conf. Rep.). 
 216. Id. § 106, at 86. 
 217. John F. Manning, Textualism and Legislative Intent, 91 VA. L. REV. 419, 428-30 
(2005). 
 218. Id. at 419, 420, 428-30 (2005); Daniel A. Farber & Philip P. Frickey, Legislative 
Intent and Public Choice, 74 VA. L. REV. 423, 437 (1988). 
 219. E.g., 136 Cong. Rec. H6920 (daily ed. Aug. 3, 1990) (statement of Rep. Bonior). 
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costs for oil spillers, and limits to liability.
220
 Sponsor and supporter 
statements indicate an intent to have oil companies internalize the cost of 
oil spills and take better preventative and response measures, but that the 
maritime transportation of oil should nonetheless continue. The legislation 
reflected a balance between environmental and economic interests; accept a 
reduced risk in return for strict liability for remediation. A hearing on the 
“rash of recent oil spills” focused heavily on the risk posed by marine 
transportation of oil while recognizing the importance of the oil shipping 
industry.
221
 The hearing convened after the House and Senate formed a 
conference committee to discuss the bill that would become OPA 90, two 
months prior to enactment, and included sponsors of the various oil 
pollution bills that formed OPA 90. Understood in this light, OPA 90 did 
not make the CWA irrelevant. Instead, OPA 90 imposed stricter regulations 
and liability requirements on the oil production, processing, and 
transportation industry while leaving other discharges of oil covered by the 
CWA. 
Following enactment of OPA 90, Congress amended the DWPA several 
times, all of which indicate a desire to expand deepwater port use.  In 1996, 
Congress amended the DWPA to expand the statutory purpose to promoting 
greater use of deepwater ports for oil transportation.
222
 In 2002, the MTSA 
amended the DWPA to allow deepwater ports to be built solely for LNG 
importation.
223
  The change intended to incentivize LNG facilities to be 
                                                                                                                 
 220. See, e.g., 135 Cong. Rec. H7893 (daily ed. Nov. 1, 1989) (statement of Rep. 
Bonior); 135 Cong. Rec. H7955 (daily ed. Nov. 2, 1989) (statement of Rep. Jones) (“tough 
standards” for oil tankers and “incumbent upon the Congress to [promote] environmentally 
safe transport of oil”); 136 Cong. Rec. S11536 (daily ed. Aug. 2, 1990) (statement of Sen. 
Mitchell) (“comprehensive legislation to prevent oil spills, improve preparedness and 
response capabilities, and ensure that shippers and oil companies pay the full cost of spills”); 
136 Cong. Rec. H6920  (statement of Rep. Bonior); 136 Cong. Rec. H6933 (daily ed. Aug. 
3, 1990) (statement of Rep. Jones). 
 221. To Examine the Rash of Recent Oil Spills Along U.S. Coasts, Emphasizing the Need 
for Oil Spill Legislation and Ratification of International Protocols: Hearing Before the 
Subcomm. on Coast Guard and Navigation of the H. Comm. on Merchant Marine and 
Fisheries, 101st Cong. 1-2 (1990) (statement of Billy Tauzin, Subcomm. Chairman).  Many 
other representatives voiced similar sentiments.  None called for banning maritime 
transportation of oil or even mentioned the natural gas industry. 
 222. The Coast Guard Authorization Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-324, 110 Stat. 3901, 
§ 502 (Oct. 19, 1996). 
 223. Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-295, 116 Stat. 2064 
(Nov. 25, 2002); H.R. REP. NO. 107-777, § 106, at 86. 
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“built offshore – not in coastal cities” to reduce the risk from terrorism,
224
 a 
clear post-September 11 addition.
225
 In 2012, Congress permitted deepwater 
LNG ports to export natural gas.
226
 Further, during these amendments, 
Congress subjected deepwater LNG ports to fewer regulations than 
deepwater oil ports. For example, the 2002 amendments to the DWPA 
specifically exempt deepwater LNG ports from common carrier status, 
unlike their oil-handling counterparts.
227
   
A holistic reading of OPA 90 also indicates that Congress had no intent 
to impose regulations on the natural gas industry. For example, Congress 
exempted offshore facilities from the COFR requirement if their worst-case 
spill discharge was less than 42,000 gallons of oil.
228
  To say that Congress 
intended for deepwater LNG ports whose worst-case spill would be less 
than one percent of that amount to be subjected to the maximum COFR 
requirement remains questionable. Offshore facilities covered by the law 
have substantially lower COFR requirements and onshore facilities have no 
requirements.
229
 Further, at the time of enactment of OPA 90, deepwater 
ports could only be licensed to handle oil;
230
 incorporation of natural gas 
facilities through reference of an amended statute whose purpose was to 
expand natural gas use hardly demonstrates an intent to regulate the natural 
gas industry.   
A comprehensive reading of the MTSA indicates Congress intended to 
address national security and terrorism. The Act focuses on thwarting 
terrorist attacks against port infrastructure and marine transportation.
231
 The 
DWPA provision can be seen as shoring up access to overseas energy 
markets and pushing critical infrastructure away from population center. 
Statements of members of Congress, the text of various bills and 
statutes,
232
 and the direction of legislation point towards Congress favoring 
                                                                                                                 
 224. 148 Cong. Rec. H22397 (daily ed. Nov. 14, 2002) (statement of Rep. Oberstar); see 
also 147 Cong. Rec. S26917 (daily ed. Dec. 19, 2001) (statement of Sen. Hollings) (“protect 
against maritime terrorism”); 147 Cong. Rec. S27739 (statement of Sen. Kerry) (very real 
threat of terrorists targeting LNG carriers in ports). 
 225. Compare the Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002, with S. REP. 107-64, at 
15-20; S. 1214, 107th Cong., Cong. Rec. S8015-23. 
 226. Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-213, 124 
Stat. 1540, § 312 (Dec. 20, 2012). 
 227. 33 U.S.C. § 1507 (2012). 
 228. 33 U.S.C. § 2716(c)(1)(A). 
 229. 33 U.S.C. § 2716(c)(1). 
 230. Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002; H.R. REP. NO. 107-777, § 106, at 86. 
 231. See discussion supra Section IV.A.2. 
 232. See id. 
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expanded natural gas use and imposing regulations on the oil industry to 
incentivize better prevention of and response to oil spills. Given this 
position, effectuating the intent of Congress would point towards finding 
OPA 90’s COFR requirement as inapplicable to deepwater LNG ports. 
4. A Dynamic Interpretation 
The dynamic interpretive approach is a “process of understanding a text 
created in the past and applying it to a present problem.”
233
 The interpreter 
seeks to reconcile the text, the history of enactment including the intent of 
the legislature, and the “evolution of the statute and its present context.”  
The text governs in correlation to its specificity.
234
 If application of the text 
in a current situation is unclear, the interpreter turns first to a historical 
perspective. The more recent the enactment and the clear the intent, the 
more weight an interpreter should accord to the history.
235
 However, if the 
“original legislative expectations have been overtaken by subsequent 
changes in society and law,” the interpreter then examines how to adapt the 
statute to those subsequent societal and legal developments.
236
 The more 
dramatic the evolution, the more weight a court should afford to those 
changes to the expense of the text and history.
237
 
Approaching the COFR requirement from a dynamic interpretative 
approach, has the statutory environment evolved to require a deepwater 
LNG port to assure the ready availability of $373 million when its uses 
minimal amounts of oil incidental to its operations if the original statute did 
not require it? A common understanding of the definition of facility in 33 
U.S.C. § 2701(6) supported by other provisions favor finding deepwater 
LNG ports as outside the definition.
238
 Any doubt is addressed by the oil-
centric purpose of OPA 90 and the terrorism focus of the MTSA, and is 
further bolstered by the expressed intent of key sponsors and supporters of 
both acts.
239
 Given the recent enactment of both acts – OPA 90 is 28 years 
old and the MTSA 16 years – and clear statements in the acts and the 
Congressional Record, a dynamic interpretation would afford great weight 
to these confirmations of the textual interpretation. Has society evolved to 
                                                                                                                 
 233. Eskridge, Dynamic Statutory Interpretation, supra note 110, at 1483. 
 234. Id. at 1496-97. 
 235. Id.  
 236. Id. at 1484, 1494. 
 237. Id. at 1496-97. 
 238. See discussion supra Section IV.A.1. 
 239. See discussion supra Section IV.A.2-3. 
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where OPA 90’s scope should expand beyond the oil industry to an LNG 
industry that merely uses small amounts of oil?  
In the last two decades, newly identified sources of oil and natural gas 
makes the United States poised to become one of the largest, if not the 
largest, energy producer.
240
 While society remains apprehensive about the 
environmental impact of fossil fuels, especially in the wake of the 
DEEPWATER HORIZON oil spill, some see LNG as a bridging strategy 
between oil and cleaner sources that poses minimal environmental risk if 
discharged into the waters.
241
 Congress has repeatedly encouraged wider 
use of natural gas and transportation via deepwater ports.
242
  Therefore, if 
there has been a societal evolution, it would trend toward greater use of 
natural gas.  Interpreting the text in that context would argue for reading 
OPA 90’s definition of facility as excluding deepwater LNG ports. 
5. Substantive Canon Fodder: Revisiting Interpretation due to a 
Remedial Nature 
Although the purpose of the act, the likely intent of the enacting 
legislature, and the plain meaning of the text make applying the COFR 
requirement dubious, might any of these interpretations be altered by 
widely interpreting the text owing to OPA 90’s remedial nature?  Courts 
generally construe remedial statutes, those enacted to rectify a specific 
problem or one caused by “unguided private conduct,” liberally.
243
 Unlike 
the other canons mentioned, this canon is substantive – i.e., not policy-
neutral. It is akin to the purposive approach, where the interpreter identifies 
the problem to be fixed and then interprets the statute accordingly.
244
 
At least one federal court identified explicitly OPA 90 as a remedial 
statute,
245
 and that finding will likely survive scrutiny. Given the detailed 
definition of facility and the comprehensive regulatory scheme, however, 
there are few open-ended mandates amenable to an expansive construction. 
Further, the problem Congress sought to remedy was large discharges of oil 
                                                                                                                 
 240. See discussion supra Section I.0. 
 241. See id. 
 242. See discussion supra Section IV.A.3. 
 243. Frank H. Easterbrook, The Supreme Court, 1983 Term – Forward: The Court and 
the Economic System, 98 HARV. L. REV. 4, 14-15 (1984). 
 244. Id. 
 245. Avitts v. Amoco Prod. Co., 840 F. Supp. 1116, 1121-22 (S.D. Tex. 1994) (OPA 90 
is a “broadly designed” “remedial statute”), vacated on other grounds, 53 F.3d 690 (1995); 
see also Angle, supra note 76, at 405. 
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into oceans and rivers.
246
 Encouraging greater use of LNG would reduce the 
amount of oil flowing over U.S. waters, reducing the potential for 
discharges. Encouraging greater use of deepwater ports would also reduce 
the likelihood of navigational accidents, a primary cause of oil spills.  
Deepwater LNG ports doubly serve the remedial aim of OPA 90. Thus, the 
remedial nature of OPA 90 would also advise exempting deepwater LNG 
ports from OPA 90’s regulatory scheme. 
B. Recommended Rule and Deference Owed   
The best test to satisfy the purpose, intent, and text is to apply an oil-
centric commercial purpose test to the presence of oil. It also represents the 
soundest policy. Essentially, the purpose of the structure, device, or 
equipment, whether for a transport or consumption, must be related directly 
to oil. Neither the purpose of OPA 90 nor the intent of the enacting 
Congress was to impose tremendous burdens on non-oil industries.  This 
test has the added benefit of being the most natural reading of the 
requirements to meet the definition of “facility”; deepwater LNG ports are 
not used for the purposes of handling or storing oil or any other oil-related 
purpose, and thus these ports should not qualify as a “facility” within the 
Act.
247
     
What implications might arise from employing an oil-centric purpose 
test? First, it will not admit to unreasonable scenarios where some facility 
handles OPA 90 quantities of oil without being subject to the law. One 
would have to watch a long parade of horribles to find a situation where a 
facility handles thousands of gallons of oil at sea for incidental use; such 
large quantities would likely trigger an oil-centric test. Second, the test 
would not exempt from cleanup costs those who discharge oil and are not 
subject to OPA 90. While OPA 90 would not cover oil discharges from a 
deepwater LNG port or a car negligently driven off a bridge or an old 
lawnmower disposed of in a tidal marsh, because none would constitute a 
facility, liability for such discharges would still be covered under the 
CWA.
248
 Third, because the test would permit only incidental uses that 
admits to minimal quantities of oil, it would be highly unlikely that such 
users could not cover cleanup costs. Thus, the COFR requirement, intended 
to ensure that responsible parties can pay, adds unnecessary assurances.  
                                                                                                                 
 246. See discussion supra Section IV.A.2-3. 
 247. Because deepwater LNG ports would not be a facility at all for the purposes of OPA 
90, they would also not be covered by the onshore facility or offshore facility requirements. 
 248. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387.  Liability for the discharge of oil is specifically addressed 
by 33 U.S.C. § 1321. 
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And unlike a pure commercial activity test, those who consume large 
quantities of oil would still be covered under OPA 90.
249
 Fourth, the test 
would give predictability to deepwater LNG port applicants and incentivize 
their development. Natural gas facilities can be built on the ocean away 
from population centers, mitigating security risks, reducing shipping 
accidents, and improving efficiency in marine transportation. Greater 
substitution of natural gas for oil would reduce carbon dioxide emissions 
and reduce the risk of oil spills by lessening the volume of oil that is 
transported on the ocean, thus fulfilling the purpose and intent of OPA 90.   
Applying an oil-centric purpose test for a structure, equipment, or device 
to determine if it constitutes a facility under OPA 90 creates a test 
consistent with the text, intent, and purpose of the law. It establishes 
predictability for any party seeking to construct or use a structure, 
equipment, or device on or adjacent to navigable waters. And, it provides a 
coherent and defendable foundation for agency and judicial decisions. 
Any intent to capture deepwater LNG ports under OPA 90’s liability 
limits lacks a strong foundation. Courts will defer to agency interpretation if 
reasonable, unless Congress specifically spoke to the issue.
250
 It would not 
be unreasonable for the Coast Guard to categorically exempt deepwater 
LNG ports from OPA 90 though an oil-centric purpose test. The Coast 
Guard has two options to issue the test. The first option would be to draft 
internal standards of review incorporating this test and then articulate the 
test whenever a party seeks a determination of the applicability of OPA 90, 
whether through the administrative or judicial process. Since it lacks 
formality, this process would be entitled to judicial respect under 
Skidmore.
251
 The outcome would be consistent with previous 
determinations and could be strongly reasoned as effectuating the purpose 
of the statute. The multifaceted examination of the statute’s text and the 
intent of the enacting Congress further add to the reasonableness of the 
outcome. A better alternative would be for the Coast Guard to promulgate 
this test though a rulemaking. The test would then receive substantial 
judicial deference under the Chevron doctrine of reasonableness.
252
  
Moreover, the rule would likely be favorably viewed in the current 
regulatory climate. 
  
                                                                                                                 
 249. See discussion infra Section IV.C.0. 
 250. See discussion supra Section III.0. 
 251. See id. 
 252. See id. 
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C. Alternative Solutions 
Promulgation of a rule or policy that finds deepwater LNG ports as 
outside of the scope of OPA 90 is hardly the only option.  Perhaps the 
energy renaissance will evaporate and future energy needs will require no 
action or the case-by-case approach of the last decade will suffice. If an 
angry environmentalist litigates, a defendant can also argue the absurd 
results doctrine, the de minimis exception, and non-incorporation by 
reference. A commercial activity test serves as an alternative option, but it 
may be both over- and under- inclusive. OPA 90 can be strictly applied, 
arguing that deepwater LNG ports are facilities, but stunting the industry 
until Congress acts. Or interested parties can petition Congress to clarify the 
statutory language. Unfortunately, each of these approaches has 
unacceptable shortcomings.  
1. Case-by-case, step-by-step, and hope we all don’t fall down 
Doing nothing is always an option. Perhaps oil prices will remain 
depressed and by the time demand for natural gas recovers, solar, wind, 
cold fusion, or the apocalypse will have rendered null any need for LNG. In 
the interim, the Coast Guard can continue with their case-by-case decision 
with minimal rational provided to applicants.  But the current approach is 
ripe for judicial intervention and gives weak assurances to potential or 
approved applicants.
253
  And, hope neither serves as a strategy nor makes 
for sound policy-making.   
2. Throw in the Kitchen Sink:  absurd results, de minimis exemption, and 
non-incorporation by reference 
If deepwater LNG port applicants continue to get exemptions and a third-
party eventually challenges it in court, the applicant or agency could defend 
with three additional, but less sound, arguments. 
First, the Coast Guard or deepwater LNG port defendant could argue that 
application of an oil pollution statute created for the oil industry to a non-oil 
industry stands as an absurd application of the statute. The “Golden Rule,” 
for statutory interpretation purposes, advises that interpreters should avoid a 
result that would produce an absurd result. Generally, interpreters apply this 
rule when adherence to the plain meaning of the text produces the absurd 
result, and will adjust the meaning only as much a necessary to get a more 
sensible one.
254
 Traditionally, courts have applied the absurd results 
                                                                                                                 
 253. See discussion supra Part 0. 
 254. Manning, supra note 160, at 2395-96; Eig, supra note 111, at 42. 
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doctrine to not give effect to language that creates outcomes so 
“unthinkable” that the legislature could not have intended it; thus, by 
amending the language to remove the absurdity, proponents argue that the 
court would better effectuate legislative intent.
255
  
One problem with the application comes from attempting to ascertain 
when a result is absurd.  An easy answer is when the text creates a logical 
inconsistency or impossibility. Less certainty exists regarding whether the 
rule applies to unreasonable, but still possible, outcomes, or merely to odd 
outcomes. A provision may be unreasonable to some as a matter of public 
policy, but perfectly acceptable to another.
256
 At potential odds with the 
absurd results doctrine as applied to unreasonable results, but not illogical 
ones, would be the rational basis standard of review used by the court to 
judge economic legislation.
257
 Under this standard, courts generally defer to 
the law unless it  “employ[s] suspect classifications or touch on 
fundamental rights.”
258
 Additionally, while some textualists recognize the 
rule, the stronger the textualist bent of the interpreter, the more constrained 
the application of the rule.
259
 
The application of the COFR requirement to deepwater LNG ports might 
seem absurd from a policy perspective. Apparently, the Coast Guard agrees; 
it has so far exempted every deepwater LNG port applicant. But those 
opposed to the use of any fossil fuels or those who want all corporations 
subject to stringent governmental oversight might disagree. So too might a 
court.  While a particular industry may be disadvantaged unfairly, Congress 
can favor certain industries over others.  And if Congress finds the COFR 
application problematic, Congress can correct the interpretation through 
legislation. Apart from a policy debate, application of the COFR 
requirement is neither logically impossible nor does it produce results 
directly contrary to the text. The absurd results doctrine is a risky gambit. 
The de minimis exception assumes that the law ignore trifles. Courts 
apply the exception to all statues absent contrary indication.
260
 The 
threshold for determining whether an activity is de minimis depends on the 
                                                                                                                 
 255. Manning, supra note 160, at 2394-95. 
 256. Id. at 2395; see, e.g., Barnhart v. Thomas, 50 U.S. 20 (2003). 
 257. Manning, supra note 160, at 2446-52. 
 258. Id. at 2447-48. 
 259. Id. at 2391-92. 
 260. Wisconsin Dep’t of Revenue v. William Wrigley, Jr., Co., 505 U.S. 214, 231 (1992) 
(“[It is] part of the established background of legal principles against which all enactments 
are adopted, and which all enactments (absent contrary indication) are deemed to accept.”). 
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purpose of the statute and the standard at issue.
261
 This exemption extends 
to statutory interpretation by administrative agencies,
262
 under the 
presumption that courts should not facilitate “pointless expenditures,” ones 
where the regulation would yield “trivial or no value” though “literal” 
adherence to a statute.
263
 The exemption does not grant a license to depart 
from the statute, but a tool to implement legislative intent.
264
 However, 
absent unambiguous legislative language to the contrary, the principle 
implicitly allows for agencies to exempt minimal risks from its regulatory 
scheme upon an “adequate factual showing.”
265
 
As deepwater LNG ports handle minimal quantities of oil, might the de 
minimis doctrine provide an alternative exemption basis? This too is 
another unlikely avenue of success. OPA 90 creates a detailed and tiered 
liability regime for vessels, creates a two-tiered regime for offshore 
facilities, and creates absolute rules for onshore facilities and deepwater 
ports. OPA 90 also creates a process to lower the liability limit and COFR 
requirement for deepwater ports, at least the oil-handling kind.
266
 Neither 
any type of vessel nor oil-handling facilities escape such liability. The text 
decidedly favors a contrary interpretation. The standard at issue in OPA 90 
seems to be any discharge.
267
 The CWA declares U.S. policy to be to permit 
zero discharge of oil into U.S. waters.
268
 Adherence to the statute would 
have quantifiable value. While the risk of a deepwater LNG port being 
unable to pay relatively small cleanup costs, the application’s value resides 
in knowing that such costs will be paid and that these ports will well-
capitalized professional operations capable of meeting any financial 
demands or regulatory mandates. Small discharges can cost thousands of 
dollars to remediate depending on the environmental sensitivity of the area, 
and small discharges in the aggregate can have a major impact. Or the value 
                                                                                                                 
 261. Id. at 231-32 (finding a state court unreasonably rejected the de minimis exemption 
when the law “operate[d] in such stark, all-or-nothing fashion”). 
 262. E.g., Federal Power Commission v. Texaco Inc., 417 U.S. 380, 399 (1974); Ala. 
Power Co. v. Costle, 636 F.2d 323, 360-61 (D.C. Cir. 1979); see also Cass R. Sunstein, 
Cost-Benefit Default Principles, 99 MICH. L. REV. 1651, 1668-69 (2001). 
 263. Ala. Power Co., 636 F.2d at 360-61.   
 264. Id.   
 265. Sunstein, supra note 262, at 1669-70 (2001). 
 266. See 33 U.S.C. § 2704(d)(2)(C). 
 267. 33 U.S.C. § 2702(a). 
 268. 33 U.S.C. § 1321(b)(1) (“Congress hereby declares that it is the policy of the United 
States that there should be no discharges of oil or hazardous substances into or upon the 
navigable waters of the United States, adjoining shorelines, or into or upon the waters of the 
contiguous zone . . . .”). 
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comes from deterring greater use of any kind of fossil fuel. While the value 
is disproportion to the heavy financial burden imposed on the natural gas 
industry, the de minimis doctrine does not requiring a weighing of the 
interests, only that there is trivial value in enforcement. There is arguably 
some value to the marine environment in strict enforcement.   
Another more promising, but still uncertain, avenue to justify the 
inapplicability of the COFR requirement would be to argue that OPA 90 
does not incorporate the reference to the DWPA as amended by the MTSA. 
Incorporation by reference refers to when a statute adopts a provision of 
another statute by referring to the other statute. For example, OPA 90 
defines deepwater as a port licensed under the DWPA, a separate statute 
codified in the same title of the U.S. Code as OPA 90, thereby 
incorporating the terms of that statute.
269
 Yet, when the referenced statute is 
amended, incorporation depends on whether the language is general, where 
the language refers generally to the law as it exists, or specific, where the 
language refers to a specific statute by name or number.
270
 A general 
incorporation includes subsequent amendments.  A specific incorporation 
does not unless the legislature expresses or implies that future amendments 
should be incorporated.
271
 However, delineation between the two is not 




OPA 90 defines a deepwater port as one licensed under “the Deepwater 
Port Act of 1974 (33 U.S.C. 1501-1524).”
273
 Technically, a deepwater LNG 
port is not licensed under the 1974 DWPA, but the 2002 MTSA-amended 
version. The very specific incorporation language references a specific act 
by its formal title. Usually, specific incorporations exclude subsequent 
amendments.
274
 However, inclusion of the U.S. Code sections might 
evidence a desire for the code to apply however amended in the future. 
While non-incorporation would be worth arguing to a court, it would not 
provide a basis for regulatory policy. Rather than interpreting a statute for 
which the Coast Guard is the responsible agency, the Coast Guard would be 
interpreting a general theory of statutory construction. This decision would 
likely then not receive the substantial deference afforded by Chevron, but 
rather only as much deference as its ability to persuade. 
                                                                                                                 
 269. 33 U.S.C. § 2701(6). 
 270. See SUTHERLAND, supra note 181, at § 51:7. 
 271. Id. at §§ 51:7-8. 
 272. See SUTHERLAND, supra note 181, at § 51:8. 
 273. 33 U.S.C. § 2701(6). 
 274. See discussion supra Section IV.C.0. 
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3. Commercial Activity Test:  Potentially Over- and Under- Inclusive   
A textual reading of the facility definition would provide a good 
foundation for a commercial activity test. However, does commercial 
activity refer to when oil is the direct object of the activity, or when oil is 
used for commercial purposes, even if such use is incidental to the overall 
purpose? The court in Southern Pacific limited commercial activity to oil 
being the direct object of the activity,
275
 and such a rule would then exempt 
deepwater LNG ports.  However, it would also exempt a large industrial 
plant that handles quantities of oil for its consumption as a lubricant or an 
ocean research laboratory with large fuel tanks or perhaps a farm with fuel 
lines running from storage tanks to irrigation pumping equipment,
276
 while 
simultaneously including a marina with a public fueling station. 
Alternatively, commercial activity could be expanded to situations where 
the incidental use of oil would be covered if used by a commercial 
enterprise. This could cover the aforementioned industrial plant and farm, 
but would then also include deepwater LNG ports.
277
 Essentially, either the 
industrial plant, the farm, and the deepwater LNG port are all facilities or 
none are facilities.
278
 As discussed above, the different theories of statutory 
interpretation strongly favor excluding deepwater LNG ports.
279
 Excluding 
the other two facilities and similar ones where oil use is only incidental to 
commercial activity might not have terrible consequences. The purpose of 
these laws is to incentivize prevention and ensure an effective response. 
These facilities would still be covered under the CWA, and due to the 
smaller discharge potential and the easier ability to seize domestic assets 
and people, the government could ensure cleanup costs are borne by the 
responsible party. However, politically, this approach might be a bridge too 
                                                                                                                 
 275. United States v. So. Pac. Trans. Co., No. 94-6176-HO., 1995 WL 84193, at *2 (D. 
Or. Feb. 20, 1995). 
 276. The fuel line to an irrigation pump was the fact pattern in Red River Farms, where 
the court found OPA 90 applicable.  Red River Farms v. United States, No. CV 08-2078-
PHX-NVW, 2009 WL 2983195, at *1-2 (D. Ariz. Sept. 17, 2009). 
 277. It would also include the locomotive in Southern Pacific, as oil was incidental to its 
commercial activity.  So. Pac. Trans. Co., 1995 WL 84193, at *2. 
 278. Perhaps the irrigation pump’s fuel line could fall under OPA 90 as the fuel line itself 
is used for the purposes of handling or transferring oil.  But, that would depend on the 
interpretation of “device” or “equipment;” is it the equipment as a whole, or does it connote 
individual pieces.  Perhaps a fuel line within an engine does not qualify, whereas a 
separately installed fuel line from a storage tank to an engine would.  But, that discussion is 
best left for another analysis. 
 279. See discussion supra Section IV.0. 
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/onej/vol3/iss6/6
2018] The Oil Pollution Act of 1990 & Deepwater LNG Ports 1475 
 
 
far. Nevertheless, a commercial activity test with oil as the direct object of 
the commerce serves as a second-best option. 
4. Invisible Hand, meet Iron (or padded) Fist 
Another option would be to find that a deepwater LNG port meets the 
definition of a facility per OPA 90’s definition and require applicants to 
fulfill the deepwater port COFR requirement.  The result would be harsh, 
dis-incentivize deepwater LNG ports, and ensure that only major energy 
companies could afford to operate them. Perhaps one benefit would be that 
the natural gas industry, especially deepwater LNG ports with an 
exemption, would likely force judicial resolution. Of course, a court could 
uphold this harsh application, but inconsistency with previous agency 
determinations gives the court fertile grounds for rejecting the rule. Plus, 
exempted facilities might be able to make a due process argument if the 
new position terminates their exemption. Congress might also see fit to 
clarify the legislation. 
A related possibility is that after applying the COFR requirement to 
deepwater LNG ports, the Coast Guard could reduce the liability limit, and 
thereby the COFR requirement, to $53 million.
280
 As mentioned earlier, one 
major problem is that this exemption only applies to deepwater ports that 
transport oil. Perhaps a dynamic reading of OPA 90, and evolution of the 
energy industry since enactment, would lead a court to expand the explicit 
and unambiguous statutory language to deepwater ports that handle LNG.  
However, given the clear statutory language, the Chevron doctrine would 
strongly argue against the Coast Guard issuing a rule on these grounds. 
5. Channel the Spirit of Lake Placid, 1980 (Congressional Action)   
The clearest way to resolve the uncertainty over whether OPA 90 
includes a deepwater LNG port would be for Congress to amend Title 33 to 
address the issue explicitly. Congress has legislated on the issue three times 
since OPA 90. However, preemptive congressional action seems unlikely 
given interest concentrated in powerful environmental and energy interest 
groups where the technical nature of the issue will dissuade mass public 
involvement.
281
 Further, in the wake of DEEPWATER HORIZON oil spill, 
                                                                                                                 
 280. 33 U.S.C. § 2704(d)(2).  The lowered statutory minimum of $50 million would be 
approximately $53 million after adjustment for inflation.   
 281. A public-choice grounded “transactional” view of the legislative process posits 
“continuous organized conflict” in situations where burdens and benefits are concentrated 
and highly technical, where Congress will produce no legislation or delegate to agency 
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any action perceived as weakening oil spill regulation could be politically 
toxic. 
Conclusion 
The natural gas industry may increase in importance and result in 
substantially greater maritime transportation of LNG. The safer and more 
economical methods of using deepwater ports by which to offload and on-
load LNG requires firm guidance on the applicability of the statute or else 
the nascent transportation industry will turn to less safe and efficient 
solutions.  A fair reading of the text of OPA 90 supported by the purpose of 
OPA 90, the DWPA, and the MSTA, and the intent of the enacting 
legislatures would justify an agency rule finding Congress intended the 
facility definition of OPA 90 to be oil-centric. Applying that rationale 
would exempt deepwater LNG ports from OPA 90, incentivizing their 
development while reducing reliance on oil, reducing the risk of an oil 
discharge, and still ensuring that a deepwater LNG port would be liable for 
discharges of oil into the environment.  
                                                                                                                 
action.  See ESKRIDGE, CASES AND MATERIALS, supra note 81, at 43-44; discussion supra 
Section II.A.3. 
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